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ABSTRACT 
The lack of a framework for selecting appropriate funding mechanisms results in 
costly and inefficient financing of public infrastructure projects in South Africa. 
The purpose of this research was to determine the nature, the utilisation and the 
appropriateness of various public infrastructure financing mechanisms.  Twenty major 
public infrastructure projects were used to conduct the exploratory study of public 
infrastructure financing practices in South Africa.  
Although the research found that South African financing practices were similar to 
practices in developed economies, it was also found that the capacity of public 
institutions to manage infrastructure projects needed strengthening. The research 
further found that markets for other mechanisms had to be developed further to 
provide more financing options.    
Finally, a conceptual framework that provides a consistent and systematic process in 
selecting appropriate and efficient public infrastructure financing decisions was 
proposed. 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Context of the study 
A number of factors such as population growth, changing structure of an economy, 
technology developments and environmental protection requirements continue to 
create a need for infrastructure development across the world.  Countries, particularly 
in developing economies, rely on the integrity of their public infrastructure such as 
roads, water and electricity to achieve sustainable growth of their economies whilst 
providing basic services such as water and sanitation to their populations.   
The acute need for infrastructure investment to support economic growth and the 
importance of private sector funding to bridge the funding gap in African countries is 
emphasised by Briceño-Garmendia & Foster (2010) and Mafusire, Anyanwu, Brixiova 
& Mubila (2010).  The importance of infrastructure and its impact on economic growth 
was also emphasized by Merrifield (2000).  Perkins, Fedderke & Luiz (2005) found 
that, in South Africa growth in gross domestic product (GDP) influences the level of 
infrastructure investment and concluded that unless infrastructure projects take place 
in response to appropriate cost-benefit analyses, economic growth targets may not 
be realised.    
A number of researchers such as Orr (2007), Briceño-Garmendia & Foster (2010), 
Sawant (2010a, 2010b) and Kingombe (2011) highlighted the need for private sector 
participation in the development of public infrastructure to supplement traditional 
sources of funding.  The global economic slowdown and constraints in the financial 
markets during the late 2000s limited the traditional development finance inflows to 
most of the developing countries.  As a result of this constraint, Mafusire et al (2010) 
noted that most of the African governments started to explore various private sector 
financing opportunities to fund their countries’ public infrastructure.    
Although South Africa, like most of developing countries, recognises the importance 
of infrastructure investment to the growth of its economy, it is unable to fund all of its 
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infrastructure requirements from traditional fiscal sources.  Despite the economic 
slowdown of the late 2000s, South Africa increased its infrastructure budget 
allocations.  Gordhan (2012) emphasised the importance of private sector 
involvement in the development and construction of public infrastructure to create 
jobs, reduce poverty and expand the South African economy.  
Given the importance of infrastructure investment in South Africa, it is critical that the 
appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of the current public infrastructure 
financing mechanisms be reviewed against global best practices. 
1.2 Problem statement 
A lack of an appropriate infrastructure financing framework results in an inefficient 
investment of public funds in the development and management of public 
infrastructure in South Africa.  
1.3 Research Questions 
The following research questions will guide how the research is conducted : 
a. What are the key financing mechanisms used to finance public infrastructure 
investments in South Africa? 
b. How appropriate and efficient are the mechanisms used to finance public 
infrastructure in South Africa? 
c. Is there a consistent framework used by public institutions to select appropriate 
and efficient mechanisms for the financing of different public infrastructure 
projects in South Africa?  
1.4 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this research was to identify key mechanisms, evaluate their 
efficiencies and propose a conceptual framework for the selection of appropriate 
options for financing public infrastructure in South Africa.   
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1.5 Significance of the study 
Since the late 1990s, public private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as an 
important mechanism to fund decades of under-investment in public infrastructure in 
South Africa.  Various types of infrastructure projects funded through PPPs ranged 
from social facilities such as prisons and hospitals to economic infrastructure such as 
national toll roads.   
Although Fay & Morrison (2005) observed a significant growth in PPPs among many 
developing countries, they also noted a growing opposition by most of the 
communities to this financing mechanism.  The authors noted that the communities 
generally believed that PPPs only benefited the private sector at the expense of the 
public.   
Calitz & Fourie (2007) noted that a significant proportion of the South African public 
also expressed concern over a number of privately financed public services.  An 
unprecedented rise in electricity tariffs and the introduction of toll fees on some of the 
public roads in the late 2000s helped to start a public debate on the efficiency and 
appropriateness of public infrastructure funding mechanisms in South Africa.   
The need for an appropriate public infrastructure investment framework in South 
Africa was highlighted by Perkins et al (2005) when they emphasised a need for 
appropriate infrastructure investment that should be recognised in public-sector 
budgets.   
Although a number of researchers such as Fay & Morrison (2005) and Mafusire et al 
(2010) have conducted research on the importance of infrastructure on the growth of 
the economy and provision of basic services, there is no available research 
conducted on the appropriateness and efficiency of public infrastructure financing 
mechanisms in South Africa.   
This research involved a review of some of the major South African infrastructure 
projects with the aim of studying the nature and extent of public infrastructure 
financing practices.   
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The output of the research will provide guidance and assistance to public and private 
sector institutions when they make decisions related to the financing of public 
infrastructure projects.   In addition, the study will provide a basis for further research 
into other specific areas of public infrastructure financing. 
1.6 Delimitations of the study 
The study was limited to South African public infrastructure projects initiated either by 
government (national, provincial, local and state owned companies) or private sector.  
As a result of insufficient publicly available data, the study did not focus on detailed 
comparisons of financing costs associated with various mechanisms used to finance 
public infrastructure projects.  This, however did not affect the achievement of the 
objectives of the study. 
1.7 Outline of the study 
The report is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the research and includes the statement of the 
research problem, purpose, significance and delimitations of the study. 
Chapter 2 contains the review of relevant literature to assist with the understanding of 
key concepts related to public infrastructure and related financing mechanisms. 
Chapter 3 outlines a research methodology used to study the research questions 
posed in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 4 contains the presentation of results of the analysis of a sample of twenty 
case studies.  The analysis is aimed at responding to the research questions.  
Chapter 5 contains the interpretation of results presented in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 6 presents a proposed conceptual framework for the financing of public 
infrastructure. 
Chapter 7 contains the conclusions and recommendations of the research.  
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CHAPTER 2  : LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The chapter starts by providing a definition of public infrastructure, followed by an 
overview of infrastructure financing needs in Africa and South Africa.  This is then 
followed by a discussion on the concept of infrastructure financing and associated risks.  
Corporate finance concepts (capital structure, pecking order and agency theories and 
risk & return) that are relevant to public infrastructure financing are then discussed.  The 
concept of project finance is reviewed, followed by a discussion of global best practices 
in public infrastructure financing options.  A discussion on the South African public 
infrastructure financing environment, including governing legislation and capital markets 
concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Public Infrastructure  
Sawant (2010b) defined public infrastructure assets as long-duration, capital-intensive 
assets, requiring massive up-front investments which are irreversible and sunk which 
have stable cash flows.   Inderst (2010) defined infrastructure in the investment context 
and said it typically includes economic infrastructure, in particular transport (e.g. ports, 
airports, roads, bridges, tunnels, parking), utilities (e.g. energy distribution networks, 
storage, power generation, water, sewage, waste), communication (e.g. transmission, 
cable networks, towers, satellites) and renewable energy.   
Inderst (2010) further defined social infrastructure to include schools and other 
education facilities, healthcare facilities, senior home, defence & judicial buildings, 
prisons and stadiums.  The author however warned that there are substantial grey 
areas in the classification of infrastructure as it depends largely on the motive for which 
the classification is done.       
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2.3 Infrastructure Financing Needs   
A number of researchers such as Fay & Morrison (2005), Briceño-Garmendia & Foster 
(2010), Mafusire et al (2010), Kingombe (2011), conducted a number of studies 
quantifying the backlog of public infrastructure investment in Africa.  Briceño-Garmendia 
& Foster (2010) estimated the public infrastructure funding gap in Africa to be between 
US$25 billion to US$95 billion per annum of which approximately US$30 billon 
remained unfunded.    
For developing countries, Kingombe (2011), Briceño-Garmendia & Foster (2010) and 
Fay & Morrison (2005) highlighted the importance of infrastructure investments to meet 
basic community needs whilst simultaneously promoting economic growth.  Whilst these 
two critical objectives may be difficult to balance, the researchers emphasised the need 
for innovative private sector and non-governmental financing mechanisms to help 
developing countries meet these objectives. 
As part of a long-term infrastructure investment plan for South Africa, Gordhan (2012) 
indicated that the value of prioritised infrastructure projects amounted to R3.2 trillion of 
which R845 billion was to be spent between 2011 and 2014 prioritising the energy, 
water and transport & logistics sectors.  Gordhan (2012) also explained that most of the 
economic infrastructure projects implemented by various state owned companies, would 
be funded from internally generated surpluses, borrowing from the capital markets and 
through PPPs.   
2.4 Public Infrastructure Financing  
Chan, Forwood, Roper & Sayers (2009) defined infrastructure financing as activities 
related to the raising and allocation of finances for the implementation of infrastructure 
projects.  The authors also defined investment as an act of forgoing current 
consumption by allocating economic resources such as labour and capital to create 
future production and income.  Chan et al (2009:11) further stated that “for funding, the 
central issue is whether governments should depend on user charges or taxes over 
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time to pay for the ongoing costs of infrastructure operation, including interest payments 
and principal payments”.  
As a result of the global financial and economic crisis in 2008-2009, Uppenberg, 
Strauss & Wagenvoort (2011) emphasised the need for private sector involvement in 
public infrastructure investment when they noted that governments would be under 
pressure to find alternative sources to fund their infrastructure investments.  
Wagenvoort et al (2010) noted the re-emergence of private sector financing of public 
infrastructure during the second half of the twentieth century driven largely by the 
political acceptance of the principles that users, rather than taxpayers pay for 
infrastructure.  The authors also noted that private financing and operation of 
infrastructure have incentive effects that foster efficiency gains. 
Chan et al (2009) stated that government finance consists predominantly of taxes and 
private finance which is made up of loans, bonds, and equity and that user fees can be 
used to reward investors once the infrastructure is up and running, but are not available 
during the construction phase.    
2.5 Private Infrastructure Financing  
The rise of private sector participation has been noted as an important development in 
public infrastructure financing by a number of researchers such as Dailami & Leipziger 
(1998), Orr (2007), Kennedy & Orr (2008), Inderst (2009) and Sawant (2010b).    
Kennedy & Orr (2008) noted that, as a result of economic slowdown during the mid-
2000s, cash-strapped governments in both developed and developing countries 
continued to seek ways to finance infrastructure investments with private sector 
participation and capital.  Platz (2009) also noted a surge in the issuance of sub-
sovereign bonds during the mid-2000s in developed countries which however was 
contrasted by a slow pace in developing countries.   
Dalaimi & Leipziger (1998) noted that most private infrastructure projects in developing 
countries are financed with a sizable amount of foreign capital with a typical financing 
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mix consisting of equity (20% to 40%) and the balance raised in the form of debt in a 
combination of syndicated bank loans, bond issues, bridge and backup facilities, 
multilateral and export credit agency loans and guarantees.  The authors also noted the 
importance of the capacity of international capital markets to supply long-term debt 
capital, which is critical for the financing of infrastructure projects with long-term assets 
whose costs may take up to 30 years to recoup.   
Swärd (2009) noted that the 1990s also experienced a significant growth in private 
investment in both developed and emerging country infrastructure, accompanied by a 
rise of private infrastructure funds.  Bothra (2009) discussed a number of infrastructure 
financing mechanisms in India which included among others, public-private partnerships 
(PPPs), special infrastructure bonds, development finance and the creation of special 
purpose infrastructure finance institutions.    
Kennedy & Orr (2008) noted a rise in the use of project finance, based on the 
perception that infrastructure and project finance focus on essential long-term valued 
assets that provide stable cash flows. This attracted pension funds into public 
infrastructure financing market through private infrastructure funds and direct 
investments by public pension funds.   
Esty (2003) also noted that project-financed investment grew from less than US$10 
billion per year in the late 1980s to almost US$220 billion in 2001.  Inderst (2009) stated 
that the idea of investing in infrastructure seemed to raise interest in many pension 
funds as infrastructure is more tangible than a lot of other complex products they are 
normally presented with, which is often difficult to detect their underlying value. 
Platz (2009) highlighted the collective issuance of bonds as a successful financing 
mechanism used in the United States of America since the early 1970s.  According to 
this concept, a credible intermediary, such as a national government can establishes a 
bond bank that collects all borrowing needs of municipalities and issues a single class 
of bond backed up by a diversified pool of loans to municipal utilities.  Platz (2009) also 
proposed the establishment of municipal development funds (MDFs) as another 
mechanism which has been implemented successfully in developing economies.  MDFs 
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are similar to pooled financing arrangements which access national bond markets for 
capital and then lend it on to local governments.  
Leigland (1997) and Martell & Guess (2006) identified a range of supply-side factors 
that may contribute to the development of the sub-sovereign bonds markets.  These 
factors include the demand for sub-sovereign financing, improved capacity of 
municipalities to manage and support debt, borrowing costs, regulatory and legal 
environments conducive to municipal borrowing and credit enhancements. 
2.6 Public Infrastructure Financing Risks 
Despite a generally monopolistic nature of public infrastructure assets, the variation of 
returns is determined by the risks inherent in the development and operation of 
infrastructure assets.  It is therefore important to understand the nature of risks 
associated with the development and financing of public infrastructure projects.   
Yescombe (2002), Inderst (2010) and Sawant (2010b) identified a number risks that 
need to be allocated and managed to ensure successful financing of the public 
infrastructure projects.  Chan et al (2009) and Inderst (2010) however cautioned that 
these risks need to be allocated with the party that is best placed to manage them in a 
cost effective way.    
The following is a brief overview of the key risks identified by the World Bank (2012). 
2.6.1 Construction Risk 
The cost of construction is fundamental to the financial viability of the project as the 
financial assumptions and ratios are all dependent on the assumed cost of the project.  
The project developer will also seek to lock in certain costs such as costs of 
commodities, as early as possible in the project so as to limit price escalation.  Delay 
risks result from the late completion of the project (by the contractor) which in turn has a 
large impact on the financial viability of a project.  Construction risk also has an impact 
on the performance of a completed project (or parts thereof).  If a completed project is 
not in a condition sufficient and necessary to meet the objectives of the project, the 
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envisaged services and/or projected cash flows originally planned for may not be 
achieved.    
2.6.2 Operating Risks 
The financial model and assumptions to the viability of a project are dependent on the 
projected costs of operations.  If the cost of operations increases more than originally 
estimated, investors and lenders would want to be protected to the extent that such 
increases will impact the revenue stream.  Certain high impact costs can be locked in 
through hedging, futures contracts and input agreements.  Where costs are not hedged, 
investors will want to be sure that these are limited.     
2.6.3  Demand Risk 
This risk refers to the probability of the demand for services provided through the 
infrastructure to be less than the projections.  A lower demand implies less revenue 
resulting in a higher probability that the project is not financially viable. 
2.6.4  Political and Regulatory Risk   
As the market for project finance transactions has expanded into developing countries, 
concerns about political risk have grown.  Key risks that arise in this regard include 
decisions by a government to cancel a project or to change the terms of the contract or 
not to fulfill its obligations.  Some of these risks are managed in project agreements with 
the government taking some of the risks or making provision for compensating a project 
developer in case of default by government.   
Since the commercial insurance market can only absorb a limited degree of true political 
risk, many project sponsors have turned to multilateral agencies or export credit 
agencies (ECAs) to shoulder some or all of this burden.   
2.6.5 Environmental risk 
Environmental and social laws impose liabilities and constraints on a project and the 
cost of compliance can be significant.  In order to attract international lenders, a project 
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must meet minimum environmental and social requirements that may exceed those set 
out in applicable laws and regulations.  Environmental due diligence in respect of 
projects and an appreciation of the environmental requirements are crucial if the project 
company and lenders are to make a proper assessment of the risks involved.  
2.6.6 Social risk 
Infrastructure projects generally have an important impact on local communities and 
quality of life, particularly in the delivery of essential services like water and electricity or 
land intensive projects like toll roads.  The impact of a project on society, consumers 
and civil society may result in resistance from local interest groups that can delay 
project implementation, increase the cost of implementation and undermine the viability 
of a project. 
2.6.7 Currency exchange risk 
This risk occurs where project finance debt is sourced from foreign lenders, in foreign 
currencies and project revenues are denominated in local currency.  The exchange rate 
between the currency of revenue and the currency of debt can increase, often 
dramatically particularly for projects in emerging economies.    
Where revenues are to be earned in some currency other than that in which the debt is 
denominated, lenders will want to see the revenue stream adjusted to compensate for 
any relevant change in exchange rate or devaluation.  If this is not available, the lenders 
will want to see appropriately robust hedging arrangements or some other mechanisms 
to manage currency exchange risk. 
2.6.8 Interest rate risk 
Interest may be charged at a fixed rate, at variable rates or a floating rate.  Project 
finance debt tends to be at a fixed rate as this helps provide a predictable repayment 
profile over time to reduce fluctuations in the cost of infrastructure services.  If lenders 
are unable to provide fixed rate debt and no project participant is willing to bear the risk, 
hedging or some other arrangements may need to be implemented to manage the risk 
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that interest rates increase to a point that debt service becomes unaffordable to the 
project.  The tension between local and foreign currency debt is often a question of 
balancing fixed rate debt with foreign exchange rate risk or local currency debt subject 
to interest rate risk. 
2.7 Key Corporate Finance Concepts 
Chan et al (2009) stated that although many public institutions employ a variety of 
financing vehicles, these generally fall into two broad categories namely cash flow 
financing and capital market financing.  Cash flow financing vehicles rely on the quality 
of cash flows from an asset being financed to repay the interest and capital.  On the 
other hand, a capital market finance vehicle relies on the quality of the balance sheet 
(debt raising capability) of an institution to raise the required finance for a specific or 
number of projects.  Firer, Ross, Westerfield & Jordan (2008) stated that corporate 
finance, amongst other considerations is concerned with decisions on long-term 
investments and sourcing of optimal long-term financing for the firm.   
According to Myers & Majluf (1984), the pecking order theory suggests that firms have a 
particular preference order for capital used to finance their businesses.  The selection of 
retained earnings (internally generated funds) and/or external funding (short and long-
term debt) and/or equity are fundamental choices that decision makers consider in the 
selection of appropriate and efficient financing mechanisms for public infrastructure 
development.   
Based on the Jensen & Meckling (1976) theory of agency cost of debt associated with 
the firm’s or project’s risk profile, it is important to understand the risk and return profile 
associated with the financing of public infrastructure assets.  The following is a brief 
overview of the capital structure, pecking order & agency theories and the investment 
risk-return relationship. 
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2.7.1  Debt and Equity Financing (Capital Structure) 
Firer et al (2008) defined a mixture of long-term debt and equity used to finance the 
operations as the capital structure of a firm.  Therefore, the financing preference (mix of 
debt and equity) of firms has an impact on the firm’s capital structure.   
Modigliani & Miller (1958) pioneered the effect of capital structure on the firm’s value 
when they stated that in the perfect capital market (absence of taxes and bankruptcy 
cots), the capital structure does not affect a firm’s value and therefore is irrelevant.  The 
theory suggests that the firm’s value depends on the ability of its assets to create value 
and it is irrelevant whether assets are financed using internal or external capital.   
Modigliani & Miller (1963) took taxation under consideration and proposed that the firms 
should employ as much debt as possible rather than using internal capital, as they can 
benefit from debt tax shields.  For tax paying entities, a tax shield allows firms to pay 
lower tax than they would if they used their own capital instead of debt capital.  The 
theory therefore argues that the more the debt, the more a firm’s value is created. 
2.7.2 Pecking Order and Agency Theories 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that, owing to information asymmetries between a firm 
and potential investors, a firm will prefer retained earnings to debt, short-term debt over 
long-term debt and debt over equity.  The theory argues that if firms issue no new 
security but only use retained earnings to support their investment opportunities, 
information asymmetry can be resolved and that firms for which information asymmetry 
is large should issue debt to avoid selling underpriced securities.    
Jensen & Meckling (1976) argued that the agency problem results from a conflict of 
interest and information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and between 
shareholders and debt-holders.  The authors stated that usually managers are 
interested in accomplishing their own targets which may differ from the firm’s value.  As 
a result, the owners try to monitor and control the behavior of managers which then 
results in agency costs of equity.   
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On the other hand, when a lender provides finance to a firm, the lender charges the firm 
an interest rate that takes into account the risk of the firm.  The theory suggests that 
managers, in the pursuit of shareholders’ interests may attempt to transfer value from 
creditors to shareholders.  As a result of the asymmetry of information, the lenders 
implement monitoring and control actions which in turn result in agency cost of debt. 
2.7.3 Risk and Return 
Inderst (2010) argued that, with the establishment of and growth in a number of 
specialist infrastructure funds in the mid-1990s, there was a need to classify 
infrastructure investment as a new asset class.  This development put the risk-return 
evaluation of infrastructure investments in the same level of scrutiny and evaluation as 
any portfolio asset.    
Despite the attractive characteristics of infrastructure assets such as low sensitivity to 
swings in the economy and markets, low correlation of returns with other asset classes, 
long-term stable and predictable cash flows, Platz (2009) warned against unrealistic 
expected returns by prospective investors. 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) 
and Black (1972) is used to determine a theoretically appropriate required rate of return 
of an asset, if that asset is to be added to an already well-diversified portfolio, given that 
asset's non-diversifiable risk.  
The model takes into account the asset's sensitivity to non-diversifiable risk (also known 
as systematic risk or market risk), often represented by the quantity beta (β), as well as 
the expected return of the market (Rm) and the expected return of a risk-free asset (Rf). 
Risk is defined as the variance of the price of an asset from its mean over a given 
period and the higher the observed variance, the higher is the risk.  Investors will always 
seek a portfolio of assets that collectively reduce the overall variation with a 
corresponding improved total return.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship in a graphical 
form.    
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For individual assets, the security market line (SML) determines the relationship 
between the expected return E(R) and the asset’s systematic risk ( β) to show how the 
market must price individual assets in relation to their risk class. The SML enables the 
calculation of the return-to-risk ratio for any asset in relation to that of the overall market.   
The return-to-risk ratio for any individual security in the market is equal to the market 
reward-to-risk ratio.   
 ( )    
 
 
  
 (  )     
 
  
 
 
The above formula is expressed as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) equation  
 ( )       (( (  )   )) 
E(R) = Expected rate of return of the asset 
Rf =  Risk free rate (e.g. short-term treasury bill rate) 
Rm = Expected market return 
β = (the beta) is the sensitivity of the expected excess asset returns  
to the expected excess market returns  
βm = is the sensitivity of the expected excess market return to itself 
therefore βm = 1 
 
 
Figure 2.1 : Capital Asset Pricing Model Diagram 
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Inderst (2010) stated that since infrastructure investment is a relatively new asset class, 
longer term it is still unclear what the appropriate risk-return profile of infrastructure 
assets is and there are not sufficient financial theories developed in this regard.  Based 
on limited history, Inderst (2010) developed a typical risk-return profile of some of key 
public infrastructure project investments.  This profile is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.2  : Risk Return Profile of Infrastructure Investments 
 
2.7.4 Project Finance 
Sawant (2010b) stated that a project-financed transaction requires the creation of an 
independent rigid structure that is off-balance-sheet and bankruptcy remote from the 
sponsoring firm.  In a corporate-financed transaction, the author explained, a firm 
invests in new assets using its balance sheet which is made available to repay capital 
providers. 
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Brealey, Cooper & Habib (1996), Yescombe (2002) and Kim & Yoo (2008) identified a 
number of key characteristics associated with project finance arrangements.  Some of 
these characteristics include a legally constituted special purpose vehicle, finite life, 
reliance on future cash flows to repay debt and investor returns, limited or no 
guarantees (non-recourse) from debt and high ratio of debt to equity (between 70% and 
90%).  In structuring appropriate and efficient project finance mechanisms the authors 
highlighted the following key considerations: 
2.7.4.1 Off-Balance Sheet Financing 
Project financing allows shareholders not to reflect the financing and project liabilities on 
the balance sheet of the sponsoring firm.  The project debt is generally held in a 
minority subsidiary as this reduces the impact of the project cost on shareholder’s 
existing debt.   
Government can also use project finance to keep project debt and liabilities off-balance 
sheet but this may reduce the effectiveness of government debt monitoring 
mechanisms.  As a result, the use of off-balance sheet debt by government should be 
considered carefully and protective mechanisms should be implemented accordingly.  
2.7.4.2  Limited Recourse 
Recourse financing gives lenders full recourse to the assets or cash flows of the 
shareholders for the repayment of a loan in the case of default by the project company.  
Project financing, by contrast is limited or non-recourse to the shareholders since the 
project company is generally a limited liability special purpose vehicle (SPV).  The 
recourse of lenders is limited primarily or entirely to the project assets (including 
completion and performance guarantees and bonds) in the case of default of the project 
company.   
2.7.4.3  Certainty of Revenue Stream 
It is important to lenders and other investors that the revenue stream is certain and that 
forecasts of revenues are accurate.  For example, lenders may wish to review the 
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demand profile for project off-take to ascertain the extent to which the project company 
will bear project risk and will be able to influence demand; 
2.7.4.4   Financial Covenants 
Given the priority of lenders to secure project revenue stream, a number of financial 
ratios become key to the analysis of a project financed transactions.  If these ratios are 
consistently breached, eventually such breaches may amount to events of default, 
permitting the lenders to accelerate, cancel outstanding loan amounts or suspend 
existing loans.  The following are some of the main ratios of interest to lenders: 
2.7.4.4.1  Debt-Equity Ratio 
The lenders will prefer a lower debt‑to‑equity ratio in order to ensure a greater 
investment from the shareholders and commitment to the project.  Shareholders, on the 
other hand, will want a higher debt‑to‑equity ratio, decreasing the amount of investment 
they will need to supply.  The agreed debt‑to‑equity ratio will be the result of a 
compromise between the project company and the lenders, based on the overall risk to 
be borne by the lenders.    
2.7.4.4.2   Loan Life Cover Ratio (LLCR) 
The LLCR is the present value of available cash for debt service up to the maturity of 
the loan, divided by the principal outstanding.  It is expressed as a ratio representing the 
number of times the cash flow (over the scheduled life of the loan) can repay the 
outstanding debt balance. 
To verify that the total outstanding debt is not at risk from a shortfall, lenders will apply a 
minimum LLCR to ensure that the total revenue available to the project company over 
the life of the loan is adequate to repay and service the total amount of debt 
outstanding. 
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2.7.4.4.3   Debt Service Cover Ratio (DSCR) 
The lenders will want to be sure that as and when each payment obligation of the 
borrower arises, the borrower will have the money available to pay that amount.   The 
DSCR measures the amount of cash flow available to meet periodic interest and 
principal payments on debt.  It examines the project company’s ability to meet its debt 
payments with reference to a particular period of time such as annually or semi-
annually, rather than over the life of the loan.   
2.7.4.4.4   Rates of Return (RoR) 
Lenders would also specify minimum returns on investment (RoI), equity (RoE) and 
assets (RoA) before financing is committed to the SPV. 
2.7.4.4.5   Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
WACC measures the average cost of capital determined by the capital structure of the 
project company.  Assuming that the interest charged on debt is much lower than the 
required returns on invested equity, a project company is encouraged to take on more 
debt thereby relieving is equity reserves for other project investments or for distribution 
to its shareholders.  
2.7.4.4.6   Lender Protection 
In a project financed transaction lenders want to ensure that the revenue stream is 
protected and that the project performs to expectations so that the lenders recover their 
loan from the project company does not default on its loan.  Lenders will therefore 
require a number of practical control mechanisms of the company, such as limitations 
on what the project company can do without lender approval and the ability to step into 
management of the project company in the event the project is not performing, and that 
they take security over project assets. 
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2.8 Financing  Mechanisms 
Chan et al (2009) stated that the provision of public infrastructure involves the 
interrelated activities of investment, funding and financing.  The authors argued that an 
efficient investment delivers the highest ratio of benefits to costs compared to other 
alternatives.   
Calitz & Fourie (2007) stated that an efficient public funding model makes up the 
shortfall between user charges and the overall costs of the infrastructure.   Chan et al 
(2009) stated further that financing should minimise the lifetime financing costs of a 
project and that financing vehicles that assign risk to the partner best placed to manage 
each type of risk are more efficient and reduce the overall cost of a project.    
2.8.1 Financing Efficiency Factors 
Chan et al (2009) stated that each financing mechanism has three main aspects, 
namely project risk management, transaction costs and information asymmetry that 
contribute to the efficiency of an investment decision. 
2.8.1.1 Project Risk 
Project risk is related to the financing, construction and operation of a project.  This risk 
can be reduced by good management and a choice of an appropriate financing 
mechanism.  An efficient mechanism can better align the incentives to the responsibility 
for managing a range of project risks.  For example, public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
may assist in transferring construction and operational risks to private partners, while 
government retains regulatory and demand risk with a commitment to underwrite 
minimum revenue from user charges. 
2.8.1.2   Transaction costs 
Transaction costs typically include negotiation, arranging, contracting, managing and 
administration costs.  Whilst the negotiations and contracting to bind risk exposures can 
be time consuming and costly, the outcomes may not always be as expected.  Having 
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adequate finance available when it is required is important for timely delivery of design, 
construction and operation of infrastructure.  Delay can impose costs in forgone 
services, although it can bring better information to guide the investment decision. 
2.8.1.3   Information Asymmetry 
As stated by Jensen & Meckling (1976), information asymmetry affects how well risks 
are ultimately allocated to the contracting parties.  A lack of information can add 
substantially to transactions costs.  Project uncertainties are generally reflected in 
higher premiums required by investors and higher hurdle rates for public investment.  
Information asymmetry can also lead to adverse selection, where good projects face a 
higher required rate of return than would be the case if information was disclosed. A 
chosen financing mechanism can influence the incentives for parties to share their 
information and hence affect the allocation of resources. 
2.8.1.4 The total cost of finance 
The total cost of financing is made up of a return paid to investors, the cost of 
contingent liabilities to government arising from exposure to project risk, transactions 
costs of the financing arrangement and any costs of delay that might be associated with 
a particular financing mechanism.    
Financing from fiscal revenue has an opportunity cost as these funds cannot be used to 
support other programmes or paid back to the taxpayer.  For projects financed using tax 
exempt bonds, the cost of the forgone tax revenue must also be included in the cost of 
financing.   
Chan et al (2009) suggested that a particular financing mechanism can therefore reduce 
the total cost of financing to the extent that it can better align the incentives for 
managing diversifiable project risk to those who have the capability to better manage 
the risk.     
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2.9 Financing Options 
The following is a brief description of various financing mechanisms identified by 
authors such as Leigland (1997), Dailami & Liepziger (1998), Allan, Schoombee & 
Theron (2005)), Calitz & Fourie (2007), Kennedy & Orr (2008), Bothra (2009), Chan et 
al (2009), Inderst (2009), Peterson (2009), Estache (2010), Inderst (2010), Masifure et 
al (2010), Sawant (2010b) and Kingombe (2011).  
Chan et al (2009), summarised the number of financing mechanisms into government 
budget appropriations, specific purpose bonds, financing of state owned companies, 
development contributions, public private partnerships and franchising agreements.  
Attah-Mensah (2005) and Kingombe (2011) noted the importance of donor funding and 
multi-lateral development finance institutions in developing economies.    
The following is a brief description of the characteristics of the key financing 
mechanisms. 
2.9.1 Budget Appropriations 
Calitz & Fourie (2007) and Chan et al (2009) stated that budget appropriations   remain 
a major source of finance for public infrastructure investment in many countries. 
Whilst this mechanism avoids a direct liability on future project revenues, it comes at the 
opportunity cost of the alternative use of the funds, including returning them to 
taxpayers who may themselves have invested at market related returns.  Other 
expenditure needs of government may delay major projects, particularly those that have 
to be completed in phases as determined by the availability of funds. 
Other than taxes, public debt is another source of funds for budget appropriations. The 
total cost of debt finance includes the rate of return on government bonds, 
administration costs associated with debt issue and the contingent liabilities of the 
project, which with financing by budget appropriation remain fully with the government. 
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As noted by Kingombe (2011), funding sourced from donors and/or development 
finance institutions are generally channeled to projects through budget appropriation 
processes by the host government.  The authors also stated some of the financing 
institutions make equity investments in private sector companies in developing 
countries. 
Chan et al (2009) stated that the main strength of the budget appropriation process, 
regardless of the method of raising funds, is the parliamentary scrutiny of appropriations 
and that the transactions costs are low compared to most other financing vehicles.   
Claitz & Fourie (2007) however pointed out that the main weakness of this mechanism 
is the almost automatic preference of government to use budget instead of other 
appropriate mechanisms.   Chan et al (2009) also pointed out that budget 
appropriations could reduce the incentives and scope to allocate project risks to those 
best able to manage them. 
2.9.2 Specific Purpose Bonds 
Chan et al (2009) defined specific-purpose securitised borrowing as the issuance of 
debt instruments such as bonds, debentures and inscribed stocks for the purpose of 
financing specific infrastructure projects.  These borrowings are usually secured on the 
asset or against the revenue stream arising from the asset.  Although this mechanism is 
one of the main sources of funding in many countries, the inability of governments to 
avoid contingent liability resulted in its phasing out of many developed economies.   
However, Jackson (2007) and Peterson (2000) had observed an increased use of this 
mechanism, particularly the municipal bond market.  El Daher (2000) observed an 
increased use of tax exempt municipal bonds but also noted that whilst these bonds 
lower the interest cost, evidence suggests that they do not fully offset the forgone tax 
revenue and fairly high transaction costs.    
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2.9.3 Financing State Owned Companies 
Chan et al (2009) stated that the experience of developed countries with the financing of 
state owned companies (SOCs) is that new infrastructure investments are 
predominantly debt financed, although a mix of instruments is often used.  Government 
dividend requirements and regulations that affect user charges, largely determine the 
capacity of SOCs to finance through retained earnings.  The SoCs may also face limits 
on borrowing in the legislation that established them which may leave capital injections 
by the shareholder government as the only source of finance. 
Further, Chan et al (2009) observed that where SOCs raise finance from the capital 
markets, their financial performance and the viability of the investment is subject to 
market scrutiny.  Where SoCs operate in a regulated market, regulators can impose 
discipline on investment decisions where price rises are not justified solely on a cost 
basis.  
2.9.4 Development Contributions 
Chan et al (2009) stated that urban expansion and the higher expectations of more 
affluent societies have increased the demand for the quantity and quality of urban 
infrastructure. With greater acceptance of the user pays principle and limits on revenue 
raising capacity of local governments, development contributions have grown as an 
alternative source of funding urban infrastructure. 
In this mechanism, sometimes referred to as "land value capture", Chan et al (2009) 
added that public sector institutions apply the principles of reasonableness and 
accountability to the determination of development charges.  The contribution liability to 
the user is proportionate to the share of the total benefit from financed infrastructure that 
is received by the development. 
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2.9.5 Public Private Partnerships 
Chan et al (2009) observed that from the early 1990s there was a significant growth in 
the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in many countries largely due the 
incentive to bring in private sector management skills.  The bundling of design, 
construction and operation of infrastructure improves the efficiency and the ability to 
bring forward the provision of the infrastructure service.  The authors also stated that 
project design and management are important to ensure that only risks that can be 
better managed by the private sector partner are allocated to them. 
Authors such as Calitz & Fourie (2007) and Sawant (2010) however warned that while 
PPPs may assist in improving productive efficiency they are no guarantee that the 
investments are optimal.  Chan et al (2009) mentioned that whilst the main advantage of 
PPPs comes from the scope for lowering the total cost of the project through improving 
project risk management, the costs of tendering, negotiating and managing contracts 
can be considerable. 
Esty (2003) sated that whilst PPPs provide a more flexible and potentially more timely 
source of finance and that risks may be transferred to private partners, the cost of risk 
will be factored into the cost of finance.   
2.9.6 Franchise Agreements 
Chan et al (2009) stated that government franchising involves a government or public 
sector agency granting an exclusive right to a private or other independent entity to 
occupy, operate and maintain publicly owned infrastructure facilities to deliver services 
over a predetermined period of time.  Through this mechanism,   infrastructure services 
are often characterised by significant economies of scale and network integration which  
reduces the scope for competition in the market. 
Franchise arrangements can introduce competition for the market through franchise 
bidding over the franchise period.  The incumbent franchisee faces incentives to be 
efficient in order to receive favourable consideration upon franchise renewal or 
retendering. 
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Chan et al (2009) however warned that while government franchises aim to achieve 
higher operational efficiencies and lower maintenance costs, they have not always 
worked as well as envisaged.     
2.10 Infrastructure Financing in South Africa 
Chan et al (2009) mentioned that whilst public institutions are concerned with an optimal 
allocation of limited funding resources to deliver public infrastructure, efficient financing 
is concerned with the optimal use of financing mechanisms to minimise costs 
associated with such available financing vehicles.     
The authors noted that decades of immunity of governments and public institutions from 
market forces has resulted in a lack of innovation and sub-optimal investments in the 
public sector.  Key to the availability of various financing options and mechanisms is the 
regulatory environment and the conditions of the financial and capital markets.    
Below is a brief overview of the regulatory and capital market environment in South 
Africa.  
2.10.1 Capital Markets 
The main sources of infrastructure financing in South Africa consist of lending from 
banks, private equity investments, PPPs and bonds. 
2.10.1.1   Bank Loan Financing 
In order to successfully implement the long-term infrastructure plan, Gordhan (2012) 
indicated that the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) will play a coordinating 
role in raising finance, in partnership with multilateral finance institutions, foreign 
investors and other investment funds.  The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
will invest directly in income generating projects, in partnership with other investors. 
Allan et al (2005) noted that since 1996, the most active and biggest funder of municipal 
infrastructure requirements has remained the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
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(DBSA) with a limited involvement of privately owned infrastructure funding companies 
such as the Infrastructure Finance Corporation (INCA).  The lack of diversity in the 
borrowing market has remained a cause for concern for government.  This is despite 
government’s policy goal of increasing private sector investment in infrastructure 
investment.  
2.10.1.2   Equity Markets 
Although South Africa has had a limited participation of private sector in public 
infrastructure financing, Gordhan (2012) indicated government is willing to create a 
conducive environment for private sector participation in the construction of public 
infrastructure.  The mid 2000s experienced an emergence of focused infrastructure 
funds through private equity holdings by large institutional investors and public sector 
pension funds.   
According to KPMG & SAVCA (2011), South Africa has one of the most sophisticated 
private equity industries among emerging and developed markets, with different funds 
at all stages of business development, from start-up venture capital funds through to 
late-stage and buy-out funds.  KPMG & SAVCA (2011) estimated that the private equity 
(PE) funds under management grew from approximately R36 billion in 2001 to R116 
billion in 2011 of which 47% were raised from South African sources.  Approximately 
75% of funds (R8.1 billion) raised in 2011 were from South African sources indicating a 
substantial interest among a number of South African investors in the market.    
Although the South African PE industry is small in comparison to the developed 
economies, KPMG & SAVCA (2011) recorded a local investment activity of 0.17% of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) which was higher than China (0.14%), Brazil (0.10%) 
and Russia (0.08%), but lower than India (0.33%) and some way off that of the United 
States (0.98%), the United Kingdom (0.75%) and Israel (2.05%). 
KPMG & SAVCA (2011) stated the South African PE industry benefited from the global 
trend towards recognising public infrastructure asset class as an attractive investment 
vehicle for investors, combined with its growing reputation as an effective means of 
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economic development for governments and development agencies.   In 2011, a total of 
R24.1 billion (21%) of total funds was classified as government investment directed 
towards infrastructure development.     
2.10.1.3   Bond Markets 
The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (2002) stated that a well-
functioning bond market has many advantages which include an alternative source of 
domestic debt finance, lower cost of capital, broadening of capital markets, efficient 
pricing of credit risks and promotion of financial stability.   
The Economic Commission for Africa (1999) stated that, because of the experience of 
the Asian crisis in the late 1990s there was a strong case for developing domestic bond 
markets as an alternative source of debt financing in most of cash strapped countries in 
emerging economies.   
Hove (2008) stated that for many emerging-market countries, the financial sector and 
capital market development start with the development of a government bond market. 
This is a logical path, not only because governments are usually the largest domestic 
borrowers and have one of the best domestic credit ratings, but also because 
governments, by their actions or inaction, affect the scope and potential for market 
development throughout the economy. 
Although well developed, the South African bond market is relatively small compared to 
developed economies.  The market trades through an independent financial exchange, 
Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA) which is licensed in terms of the Securities 
Services Act No.36 of 2004 (SSA).  BESA, a self-regulated organisation operates under 
an annual license granted by the country’s securities market regulator, the Financial 
Services Board (FSB). 
Allan et al (2005) noted that prior to 1994, South Africa partly financed its economic 
infrastructure such as bulk water supply, electricity and roads through bonds issued by 
state owned companies such as the Water Boards (e.g. Rand Water) and the electricity 
utility, ESKOM.  Allan et al (2005) further noted that, prior to 1994 there was an active 
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municipal bond market which was underpinned by a system of prescribed asset 
requirement.  The system required financial institutions to invest a prescribed 
percentage of their portfolios in government debt.    
Moody’s (2011) noted that South Africa’s municipal bond market grew almost five-fold 
since 2004 bringing the size of the municipal bond market to R12.3 billion by the end of 
first quarter of 2011. Notwithstanding these good growth prospects Moody’s (2011) 
noted that traditional bank lending would remain a major source of debt funding for 
municipalities.    
2.10.2 Regulatory Environment 
The financing of public assets in South Africa is regulated by legislation such as the 
Public Finance Management Act No.1 of 1999 (PFMA), the Municipal Finance 
Management Act No.56 of 2003 (MFMA) and the Division of Revenue Act (DoRA).    
The involvement of private sector in the financing of public infrastructure through public-
private-partnerships (PPP) is regulated by Treasury Regulations issued in terms of the 
PFMA and MFMA.  The PFMA and MFMA define a PPP as an agreement between a 
public institution and a private party in terms of which the private party undertakes to 
perform an institutional function on behalf of the public institution for a specified or 
indefinite time.   
In a PPP arrangement, the private party receives a benefit for performing the function 
by way of compensation from a revenue fund or fees collected by the private party from 
users of a service provided to them.  It is further expected that the private party takes 
substantial risks arising from the performance of the function.  The regulation states that 
where a private party performs an institutional function without accepting significant 
risks, such an agreement is not a PPP agreement and must be dealt with as a normal 
borrowing transaction in terms of an appropriate legislation.  
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2.11 Conclusion of the Literature Review 
A number of authors have highlighted the need for public infrastructure development to 
satisfy social and economic development needs of the public sector.  Since the late 
2000s, public infrastructure investment has been considered by long-term investment 
institutions such as the pension funds as an asset class on its own.   
The financial crisis of the late 2000s compelled many governments to consider other 
mechanisms to finance their infrastructure developments over and above traditional 
sources such as budget appropriations and donations.  As a result of a decline in the 
availability of traditional sources, Fay & Morrison (2005), Briceño-Garmendia & Foster 
(2010) and Kingombe (2011) emphasised the importance of private sector involvement 
in the financing of public infrastructure.   
In order to attract private sector involvement in financing public infrastructure, Inderst 
(2010) emphasised the need to develop a risk-return profile to assist investors to make 
appropriate decisions.  Calitz & Fourie (2007) stated that project design, regulatory 
environment and risk management are among the key success factors necessary to 
attract the private sector to invest in the public infrastructure.   
Chan et al (2009) described an efficient financing mechanism as that which best 
allocates the risk to the parties best capable of managing the risk thereby reducing the 
cost of financing the infrastructure.  The authors stated that the reduction of project risk, 
transaction cost factors and information asymmetry between the public and investors 
contribute to more efficient investment decisions.     
Calitz & Fourie (2007) identified four key financing mechanisms that are practiced in 
South Africa, namely budget appropriations, debt (loan finance), equity (internal 
reserves) and private equity (PPP finance).   In their study of public infrastructure 
financing trends in developed economies, Chan et al (2009) provided an analysis of 
various mechanisms such as budget appropriations, specific-purpose borrowings, off-
budget financing (state owned companies), development contributions, public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) and franchising arrangements. 
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The South African public infrastructure investment environment is supported by active 
capital and financial markets.  In addition, the regulatory environment provides guidance 
to both the public and private sector to enable an objective assessment of the nature 
and extent of their involvement in public infrastructure financing.  
Since private sector investment decisions are predominantly based on an expected 
return from a project, the understanding of a risk-return profile of public infrastructure is 
critical in selecting an appropriate and efficient financing mechanism.  Based on the 
observation by Inderst (2010), there is currently no established risk-return benchmark 
for infrastructure investments.  This research therefore becomes appropriate, 
particularly for South Africa in ensuring the efficient financing of major infrastructure 
investments in future. 
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CHAPTER 3  : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The objectives of the research were firstly to determine key financing mechanisms, 
secondly whether these mechanisms are appropriate and efficient to finance public 
infrastructure investments.  Lastly, the research had to determine whether there exists a 
consistent framework used by public institutions to select appropriate and efficient 
mechanisms to finance various public infrastructure projects.    
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the research objectives, a case study 
approach was adopted as a methodology of analysis. The results from the analysis of  
the case studies enabled the researcher to achieve the objectives of the research. 
Yin (2009) defined case study research as an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context and that it explains, 
describes, illustrates and enlightens.  Farquhar (2009) stated that the value of case 
study research is that it allows the researcher to examine a problem or question in a 
practical, real-life situation and is particularly suitable for description, explanation and 
exploratory research.   
Stake (1995) stated that an instrumental case study provides a general understanding 
of a phenomenon using a particular case and a collective case study is done to provide 
a general understanding using a number of instrumental case studies that either occur 
on the same site or come from multiple sites.   Farquhar (2009) stated that in the case 
study methodology, the area of a study is restricted to a small number of units thus 
enabling the researcher to look in depth at a topic of interest or phenomenon. 
Yin (2009) stated that the advantages of case study research are that the methodology 
fosters the use of multiple sources of data which facilitates validation, entails a detailed 
and particular focus on the subjects of the study and that the researcher has no control 
over events within the researched organisations and/or projects.   
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Sarantakos (2005) however warned that the limitations of the case study methodology 
is that it is vulnerable to criticisms in relation to credibility of generalisations.  In addition, 
the author stated that the metohodolgy is perceived to be suitable only for qualitative 
research and focusses on processes rather than end products and access to case study 
settings can be demanding which in turn can seriously affect the study.   
Other critics of case research such as Miles (1979) also suggested that the usefulness 
of case study methodology is limited to an exploratory phase in a hierarchically 
arranged research programme.  Yin (2009) however highlighted that the purpose of a 
case study methodology is to expand and generate theory or ‘analytical generalisation’ 
as opposed to proving theory or ‘statistical generalisation’.   
Given the exploratory nature of the research, a multiple-case study methodology was 
adopted as an appropriate instrument to gain an in-depth understanding of the key 
financing mechanisms and their appropriatenes/efficiency in developing public 
infrastructure projects in South Africa. 
3.2 Population 
The target population for the research consisted of all public infrastructure projects 
funded through various financing mechanisms by national, provincial departments, 
municipalities and state owned companies.  
3.3 Sample 
Farquhar (2009) stated that the aim of case study research is not to make statements 
about the cases to a larger population but to explore in depth a particular phenomenon 
in a contemporary context.  Hamel, Dufour & Fortin (1993) argued that the relative size 
of the sample does not transform a multiple case into a macroscopic study.   
Hamel et al (1993) further stated that the goal of the study should be to establish the 
parameters that can be applied to all research and therefore argued that even a single 
case could be considered acceptable, provided it met the established objective. 
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Where a multiple case study approach is adopted, Umit (2005) suggested that the 
design must follow a replication logic where each case consists of a whole study in 
which facts are gathered from various sources and conclusions drawn on those facts.  
The author further argued that multiple cases strengthen the results by replicating the 
pattern-matching, thus increasing confidence in the robustness of the theory.  
Harling (2002) stated that when using multiple cases, the question of how many arises 
and warns that when the case studies are too few, generalisation becomes difficult and 
if too many, depth of understanding becomes difficult to achieve.   
For the purposes of this research, a sample of twenty public infrastructure projects that 
were financed through various mechanisms by national, provincial, local and state 
owned companies were selected.  Although a convenient sample was selected using 
non-probabilistic means, the sample is a balanced representation of public infrastructure 
projects and financing mechanisms practiced in South Africa.    Table 4.1 provides a 
summary of the sample profile.      
3.4 Data Collection 
Yin (2009) recommended the use of any of the six sources of evidence for data 
collection namely, documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant observation and physical artifacts in case study approach.  Direct 
observation, participant observation and physical artifacts are used predominantly in 
sociological research and were therefore not relevant in this research.   
Umit (2005) explained that documents could be letters, agendas, administrative 
documents, newspaper articles or any document that is related to the investigation as 
the documents serve to strengthen the evidence from other sources while they are also 
useful for making inferences about events.  The author further explained that the 
interviews are one of the most important sources of case study information which  can 
be open-ended, focused and structured.     
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Stake (1995) identified triangulation as a quality assurance tactic to ensure that case 
study research is based on a disciplined approach and not simply a matter of intuition, 
good intention and common sense.  Triangulation in case study research refers to a 
process in which the researcher uses multiple sources of data to establish and verify 
meaning.  In this way the researcher actively seeks different perspectives on the case 
study topic to check interpretation and to reveal alternative meanings.   
In the research, information was gathered from a number of publicly available sources 
such as annual reports, technical reports, government reports and database managed 
by the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) unit of the National Treasury.  In certain cases, 
key public and private sector personnel involved in public infrastructure financing and 
implementation were interviewed to verify and validate information obtained from public 
sources.   
3.5 Framework of Analysis 
Harling (2002) stated that when multiple cases are used, a typical format is to provide a 
detailed description of each case and then present the themes within the case (within 
case analysis) followed by thematic analysis across cases (cross-case analysis).  The 
author further stated that in the final interpretative phase, the researcher reports the 
lessons learnt from the analysis.   The following is a brief description of the framework 
adopted to analyse the sample of case studies. 
3.5.1 Financing Mechanism 
For each case study considered the financing mechanism used was identified followed 
by a discussion of its unique features and their impact of the project.  In order to identify 
the appropriateness of the mechanism, the total risk associated with each case study 
was analysed against a number of criteria obtained from the literature review.  The 
criteria included the ability of the mechanism to diversify project risks, minimise 
transaction costs and minimise information asymmetry factors.  Appendix B provides a 
detailed description of the risk analysis framework.   
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3.5.2 Financing Option Framework 
A number of authors such as Esty (2003), Calitz & Fourie (2007), Chan et al (2009) and 
Sawant (2010b) confirm that public infrastructure is financed either through project 
finance (cash flow) or corporate finance (debt and equity) and that all financing 
mechanisms fall in either of the options. 
In order to determine whether public institutions utilise a common framework to select a 
financing (project finance or corporate finance) option appropriate for the financing of 
public infrastructure project, an assumtion was made that there exists a relationship 
bewteen the financing option and key risk factors such as project risks, transaction 
costs and information asymmetry.  This relationship is represented by the following 
multiple regression model : 
                                          
Pi represents a probability that a project finance option is chosen by a public institution 
to finance a project (i), given the corresponding amounts of assessed project risk 
(PRS_i), transaction cost risk (TCRS_i) and risk associated with information asymmetry 
(IARS_i) between the public sector institution and prospective investors.    Pi = 1 when a 
project finance option is chosen and 0 if not chosen (or corporate finance option is 
chosen). 
The existence of a relationship between the choice of a financing option (dependent 
variable) and its independent variables (project, transaction cost and information 
asymmetry risk sores) is tested by checking whether the coeficients of the independent 
variables in the multiple regression model are statistically significantly greater than zero  
at a 5% significance level.   
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Gujarati (2003) recommends that the above equation be expressed in the form of a 
cumulative logistic distribution function (LOGIT model) as indicated below : 
       (
  
 -  
)                                        
 
where 
Pi  = Probability that a Project Finance Option is chosen given 
the values of independent variables for project i 
1- Pi = Probability that a Project Finance Option is not chosen 
given the values of independent variables for project i 
Y = 1 (Project Finannce Option Chosen)  
ln = Natural logarithm 
PRS_i = Project Risk Score for a particular project i 
TCRS_i = Transaction Cost Risk Score for a particular project 
IARS_i = Information Asymmetry Risk Score 
βj = for j=1,2,3; coefficient of variable (PRS, TCRS, IARS) which 
measures the change in L (log of odds) for a unit change in 
the independent variable score, 
α = y intercept (constant) = value of L (log of odds) when the 
value of all risk scores are equal to zero. 
ε = the error term of the regression model 
   
   
Risk Score = Average Rating / 5 
Rating = 1 (very low); 2 (low); 3 (average); 4 ( high); 5(very high) 
   
 
Since the coefficient of variable i measures the change in L (log of odds) for a unit 
change in the independent variable, if the coeficient is not significantly greater than 
zero, it is concluded that the variable i does not explain a change (choice of the project 
finance option). 
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CHAPTER 4 : PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
 
In order to achieve a high and consistent quality in the analysis of case studies, Yin 
(2009) recommended four principles to be adhered to namely, showing that the analysis 
relied on all the relevant evidence, inclusion of all major rival interpretations in the 
analysis, addressing the most significant aspect of the case study and the use of the 
researcher's prior, expert knowledge to further the analysis.   Harling (2002) stated that 
although case study research case is formal, it includes the researcher’s opinions and 
judgments and is structured to persuade the reader to accept the researcher’s 
conclusions. 
This section  is therefore aimed at summarising the results based on the analysis of the 
case studies in relation to the research questions highlighted in Chapter 1 of this 
research report namely ;  
a. What are the key financing mechanisms used to finance public infrastructure 
investments in South Africa? 
b. How appropriate and efficient are the mechanisms used to finance public 
infrastructure in South Africa? 
c. Is there a consistent framework used by public institutions to select appropriate and 
efficient mechanisms for the financing of different public infrastructure projects in 
South Africa?  
The following is a presentation of key observations extracted from the analysis of the 
case studies.    Table 4.1 provides a summary of key information extracted from the 
case studies in Appendix A. 
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Table 4.1 : Summary of Case Studies 
4.1 Sample Characteristics 
Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of projects in the sample that were implemented by 
different spheres of government (national, provincial and municipalities) and SoCs.  The 
sample consisted of 35% of projects implemented by the SoCs, followed by Provinces 
(30%), National (20%) and Municipalities at 15%. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the range of project values for the sample case studies.  The 
sample had 30% of projects with values less than a R1 billion, 25% between R1 billion 
and R5 billion, 15% between R5 billion and R20 billion, 15% between R20 billion and 
R50 billion and 15% in excess of R50 billion. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates that 70% of case study projects were classified as economic 
infrastructure and 30% as social public infrastructure.    
Type Project Name Financing Mechanism
Infrastructure 
Type
 Project  Cost 
( million) 
Concession 
Period 
(years)
Completion  
Year
1 National Toll Road Maputo Corridor (N4) PPP Economic R 3 000 30 1996
2 National Toll Road Bela-Bela - Rustenburg Corridor (N4) PPP Economic R 3 000 30 2003
3 National Toll Road Durban - Johannesburg Corridor (N3) PPP Economic R 10 000 30 2001
4 Government Office Accommodation Department of Trade and Industry PPP Social R 500 25 2004
5 Government Office Accommodation Department of Education PPP Social R 403 25 2010
6 Prisons Bloemfontein and Louis Trichardt PPP Social R 3 500 25 2002
7 Water and Sanitation Ilembe District Municipality PPP Economic R 16 30 1999
8 Hospital Inkosi Chief Albert Luthuli PPP Social R 1 200 15 2001
9 Hospital Humansdorp PPP Social R 13 20 2004
10 Hospital Pelonomi - Universitas PPP Social R 20 20 2004
11 Energy Generation Eskom SoC Financing Economic R 340 000 n/a 2020
12 Energy Generation
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer 
Programme
PPP Economic R 100 000 15 2015
13 Road Upgrade Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project PPP Economic R 22 000 15 2011
14 Airports ACSA SoC Financing Economic R 50 000 n/a 2011
15 Freight Logistics Transnet SoC Financing Economic R 300 000 n/a 2020
16 Passenger Rail Gautrain High Speed Rail PPP Economic R 26 000 20 2011
17 Industrial Development Zone Coega IDZ Budget Appropriations Economic R 25 000 50 2020
18 Industrial Development Zone Dube Trade Port Budget Appropriations Economic R 10 000 n/a 2010
19 Public Transport Rapid Public Transport System : City of JohannesburgFranchising Economic R 4 600 12 2010
20 Land Value Capture Durban Point Waterfront Development
Development 
Contribution
Economic R 150 n/a 2006
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Figure 4.4 illustrates that only 10% of the case study projects were completed before 
2000, 35% between 2000 and 2005, 35% between 2005 and 2012 (35%).  A total of 
20% of projects would be completed after 2012.     
 
 
Figure 4.1 : Profile of Sample Projects   
  
  
 
 
Figure 4.2 : Sample Project Values 
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Figure 4.3 : Infrastructure Type  
 
 
 
Figure 4.4  : Project Completion Profile 
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4.2 Key Financing Mechanisms  
Figure 4.5 and Table 4.2 indicate that approximately 65% of infrastructure projects were 
financed through public private partnerships (PPPs).  The balance was financed through 
SoC balance sheets (15%), budget appropriations (10%), Franchising (5%) and 
Development Contributions (5%).   No projects were financed through specific purpose 
bonds.  The use of PPPs was evenly spread across the national, provincial departments 
and SoCs.   
 
Figure 4.5 : Proportion of Financing Mechanisms 
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Table 4.2 : Proportion of Financing Mechanisms 
 
4.3 Appropriateness of Financing Mechanisms 
4.3.1 Utilisation of Financing Mechanisms 
Figure 4.6 indicates that all social infrastructure projects were financed through PPP 
mechanisms.  Economic infrastructure was financed through various financing 
mechanisms with PPP constituting the highest frequency (35%), followed by SoC (15%) 
and the least is Franchising and Development Contributions at 5% each.  
 
 Figure 4.6 :  Financing Mechanism and Infrastructure Type 
Budget 
Appropriations
Specific 
Borrowing
SoC         
Balance Sheet
Development 
Contributions
PPP Franchising Total
National 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 20%
Provincial 10% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 30%
Municipality 0% 0% 0% 5% 5% 5% 15%
SoC 0% 0% 15% 0% 20% 0% 35%
Total 10% 0% 15% 5% 65% 5%  
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Figure 4.7 shows a breakdown of the total value of public infrastructure projects 
financed through various mechanisms across the case study projects.  A total of 82% 
was financed through the balance sheets of SoCs followed by PPPs (14%) and  
Government Appropriations (4%).  The value of projects financed through Development 
Contributions and Franchising were insignificant at 0.02% and 0.55% respectively.   
 
Figure 4.7 :  Project Value and Financing Mechanisms 
 
4.3.2 Project Risk and Implied Financing Cost 
Inderst (2010) and Chan et al (2009) demonstrated that the total cost (efficiency) of a 
financing mechanism is largely determined by the risk-return profile of a public 
infrastructure project.  Therefore, in order to understand the efficiency of a financing 
mechanism, it is important to first understand the risk profile of the project which in turn 
will indicate a return expected by potential investors.    
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Using the assessment framework in Annexure B, a Total Risk Score (TRS) associated 
with the financing mechanism of each project case study was calculated.  The TRS is a 
weighted average of the Project Risk Score (PRS), Transaction Cost Risk Score 
(TCRS) and Information Asymmetry Risk Score (IARS).  Appendix C contains a detailed 
computation of individual case study scores.    
Figure 4.8 illustrates the Project Risk Score for each case study.  A total of 45% of case 
study projects scored between the minimum (0.2) and average (0.6) risk level and the 
balance of 55% of projects scored higher than the average but less than the maximum 
risk level. 
 
 
Figure 4.8  :  Project Risk Scores 
 
Figure 4.9 illustrates Transaction Cost Risk Scores for each of the case study projects. 
The diagram indicates that 60% of the projects cases had transaction cost risks 
between the minimum (0.2) and average (0.6) risk levels.  The Development 
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Contribution (Land Value Capture) financed project had the highest (0.87) above the 
average risk level. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9  :  Transaction Cost Risk Scores 
 
Figure 4.10 illustrates the risk scores related to Information Asymmetry for each of the 
twenty project case studies.  The diagram indicates that 80% of the project cases had 
information asymmetry risk between the minimum (0.2) and average (0.6) risk levels.  
Two PPP, Franchising and Development Contribution (Land Value Capture) financed 
projects had the highest (0.80) risk levels. 
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Figure 4.10 :  Information Asymmetry Risk Scores 
 
Figure 4.11 illustrates the Total Risk Score (TRS) for each case study.   The diagram is 
based on an equal weighting assigned to each of the risk areas namely project risk, 
transaction costs and information asymmetry.  The diagram indicates that 75% of the 
projects had a TRS ranging within the minimum (0.2) and average (0.6) risk levels.  
Notably, the Franchising and Development Contributions (Land Value Capture) financed 
projects had the highest TRS at 0.78 and 0.81 respectively. 
Figure 4.12 shows that a total of 70% of all projects fell within a TRS range between 0.4 
and 0.6, 20% between 0.6 and 0.8 and 10% above 0.8.   
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Figure 4.11  :  Total Risk Scores   
 
 
 
Figure 4.12  :  Total Project Risk Score Distribution 
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4.4 Framework for Financing Mechanisms 
For each of the twenty case studies, the financing mechanism was classified either as 
project finance or corporate finance. 
In order to determine whether public institutions use a uniform framework in choosing a 
financing option (project or corporate finance), the observed financing options were 
regressed against the project risk score (PRS), transaction cost risk score (TRS) and 
information asymmetry risk score (IARS).    
As determined in section 3.5.2 of the report, the relationship between the financing 
option and risk factor scores is given by the following equation :  
      (
  
    
)                                        
  where : 
Pi   
 
= Probability that a Project Finance Option is chosen given 
the values of independent variables for project i 
1- Pi  = Probability that a Project Finance Option is not chosen 
given the values of independent variables for project i 
ln = Natural logarithm 
PRS_i = Project Risk Score for a particular project i 
TCRS_i = Transaction Cost Risk Score for a particular project 
IARS_i = Information Asymmetry Risk Score 
βj = for j=1,2,3; the coefficient of variable (PRS, TCRS, IARS) 
which measures the change in L (log of odds) for a unit 
change in the independent variable score, 
α = y intercept (constant) = value of L (log of odds) when the 
value of all risk scores are equal to zero. 
ε = the error term of the regression model 
   
   
Risk Score = Average Rating / 5 
Rating = 1 (very low); 2 (low); 3 (average); 4 ( high); 5(very high) 
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Table 4.3 summarises the results of the regression model from the Eviews software 
package. 
Dependent Variable: FINANCING_MECHANISM  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 12/17/12   Time: 11:51   
Sample: 1 20    
Included observations: 20   
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations  
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     INFORMATION_ASSYMETRY 0.616083 2.922787 0.210786 0.8331 
PROJECT_RISK 6.096310 5.873653 1.037908 0.2993 
TRANSACTION_COSTS_RISK -10.70669 5.630053 -1.901704 0.0572 
C 3.209219 2.918344 1.099671 0.2715 
     
     McFadden R-squared 0.223824    Mean dependent var 0.700000 
S.D. dependent var 0.470162    S.E. of regression 0.451284 
Akaike info criterion 1.348277    Sum squared resid 3.258518 
Schwarz criterion 1.547423    Log likelihood -9.482767 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.387152    Deviance 18.96553 
Restr. deviance 24.43457    Restr. log likelihood -12.21729 
LR statistic 5.469038    Avg. log likelihood -0.474138 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.140502    
     
     Obs with Dep=0 6     Total obs 20 
Obs with Dep=1 14    
     
     
       Table 4.3  :  Multiple Regression Output 
 
Based on the output, it can be concluded that at a 5% significance level all the 
coefficients of independent variables are statistically insignificant.  This means that, 
based on the sample of case studies, none of the variables (risk factors) have an 
influence in the selection of a financing option (project finance or corporate finance) for 
the development of public infrastructure.   
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CHAPTER 5  : INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
This chapter interprets the results presented in Chapter 4.  The interpretation is done in 
line with the research questions posed in Chapter 1 namely: 
a. What are the key financing mechanisms used to finance public infrastructure 
investments in South Africa? 
b. How appropriate and efficient are the mechanisms used to finance public 
infrastructure in South Africa? 
c. Is there a consistent framework used by public institutions to select appropriate and 
efficient mechanisms for the financing of different public infrastructure projects in 
South Africa?  
5.1 Introduction 
Since 1996, the growing trend in public infrastructure investment in South Africa 
necessitated the use of other financing mechanisms in addition to the traditional 
sources.  Although Chan et al (2009) noted that government appropriations remain the 
largest mechanism to finance public infrastructure, other options are gaining popularity 
at different spheres of government in South Africa. 
Whilst the delivery of social infrastructure remains the mandate of government, since 
the early 2000s a significant portion of economic infrastructure such as road, rail, 
energy and water has been delivered by state owned companies (SoCs).  As noted by 
Inderst (2009), since the late 2000s there was a growing recognition of infrastructure as 
an asset class of its own by many South African pension funds and public infrastructure 
investment institutions.   
Based on the case study observations, other than the growth in the number of 
infrastructure projects, the value of individual projects is showing a substantial growth 
since the first large PPP project in 1996.  The pressure to fund other social needs and 
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related infrastructure has encouraged government to seek alternative financing 
mechanisms, particularly for economic infrastructure.   
Although the current experience seems to indicate that privately funded infrastructure, 
e.g. through PPPs, is more costly than traditional sources government has committed 
itself to creating a conducive environment for private sector participation in public 
infrastructure development. 
5.2 Key Financing Mechanisms  
Except for specific purpose bonds, the case studies have confirmed that key public 
infrastructure financing mechanisms observed in the literature review, namely budget 
appropriations, state owned company balance sheet financing, development 
contributions, public private partnerships and franchising arrangements are also 
applicable in the South African environment. 
5.2.1 Budget Appropriations 
As noted by Calitz & Fourie (2007) and Chan et al (2009), budget appropriations remain 
the most important source of financing infrastructure investment in South Africa.   Since 
the late 1990s, government has made significant contributions towards public 
infrastructure investment.  The contributions have largely been in the form of equity 
contributions in PPP projects or shareholder loans to SoCs.  These contributions are 
however dispensed through normal budget appropriation processes.  
5.2.2 Specific Purpose Bonds 
Although South Africa has one of the most active organised bond markets in the world, 
the issuing of specific purpose bonds has not gained momentum.  For the successful 
utilisation of this mechanism, there is a requirement to develop complex technical and 
legal structures for the provision of security against revenue streams and assets.  This 
demands, particularly from the public sector, high levels of skill and capacity to structure 
and manage projects financed through this mechanism.   
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5.2.3 SoC Balance Sheet Financing 
Most of the economic infrastructure in South Africa is delivered through SoCs who have 
more flexibility than other public institutions to source external funding to complement 
their internal sources of revenues.  SoCs are better able to raise debt from local and 
international markets using their balance sheets and political support from government.    
During the financial crisis of the late 2000s, the close association of SoCs with 
government however had a negative impact on their credit ratings as a result of the 
downgrading of sovereign debt.  In certain instances, the refusal to by some regulators 
to approve higher tariffs and/or government's reluctance to make shareholder 
contributions resulted in the downgrading of some SoC debt.  
Despite these challenges, the SoC financing mechanism is and continues to be the 
most popular alternative to the budget appropriation mechanism to finance economic 
infrastructure in South Africa.  The independence, regulatory flexibility and skill base 
associated with the SoCs are some of the major factors that contribute to their ability to 
leverage own funding to finance infrastructure development.      
5.2.4 Development Contributions 
Whilst this mechanism is important for raising finance, it has not been fully utilised by 
many public sector institutions for the development of their infrastructure or for revenue 
generation purposes.  The restricted use of this mechanism can largely be attributed to 
the capacity and ability of many public institutions to structure and implement projects 
for the optimal benefit of the public.   
Project structuring and development processes associated with this mechanism 
generally take long and benefits such as urban regeneration, investor confidence, job 
creation and increased rates and tax revenue become realisable in the long term.  Most 
public institutions become reluctant to use this mechanism because it generally requires 
the disposal of underutilised public assets.   
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5.2.5 Public Private Partnerships 
Despite the negative perceptions of this mechanism in developing economies, it has 
gained popularity and continues to be a preferred public infrastructure financing option 
in South Africa.  The preference for the mechanism can be attributed to its ability to 
transfer risk from the public to the private sector and the provision of critical skills to 
deliver complex and high value projects.   
However, the high transaction costs and information asymmetry associated with this 
mechanism results in high financing costs.  The public sector skill and capacity to 
initiate, negotiate, close and manage PPP contracts is the single most important factor 
that contributes significantly towards the reduction of costs resulting from transaction 
and information asymmetry risk factors.  
5.2.6  Franchise Arrangements 
This is a relatively new mechanism of delivering services through existing public 
infrastructure assets.  The lack of capacity within the public sector to initiate, negotiate 
and manage franchise arrangement projects is a major constraint limiting the use of this 
mechanism. 
The type and amount of risk assumed by the public sector in this mechanism can be 
substantial resulting in using alternative mechanisms such as budget appropriations or 
PPPs.  The mechanism can however be used in combination with other mechanisms to 
ensure the optimal utilisation of public assets.   
5.3 Appropriateness of Financing Mechanisms 
5.3.1 Budget Appropriations 
The budget appropriations mechanism is efficient when the public sector assumes a 
lead role in the implementation of public infrastructure, particularly in the early stages of 
the project where the commercial viability is still uncertain.  For the development of 
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social infrastructure, this mechanism is the most appropriate as it provides certainty to 
the investor in respect to the commitment of the public sector to the project. 
The mechanism has also been successfully utilised to provide equity and guarantees in 
social infrastructure and other PPP projects.  It has also been successfully utilised as a 
guarantee to minimise demand risk on capital intensive economic public infrastructure 
projects and to finance franchising arrangements projects. 
5.3.2 Specific Purpose Bonds 
Although this mechanism is not generally used, there is a wide and varied use of 
general purpose bonds to finance public infrastructure investments in South Africa.  
Except for budget appropriations, this mechanism is generally associated with lower 
financing costs and encourages good corporate governance and discipline to the 
issuing institution.  Where general purpose bonds have been used, particularly by 
municipalities, they are subjected to very strict financial covenants which only a few 
municipalities can meet.  This mechanism has been used successfully by the SoCs to 
leverage their balance sheet capabilities. 
Attah-Mensah (2005), Mafusire et al (2010) and Kingombe (2011) have expressed a 
need, particularly for African economies, for the establishment of infrastructure 
institutions that will focus on the development of project specific bonds relevant and 
appropriate for the continent.  These instruments, the authors argued that they could 
particularly be important in facilitating cross country infrastructure projects such as rail, 
road and energy or water regional distribution schemes.   
5.3.3 SoC Balance Sheet Financing 
This mechanism has been the most utilised towards the development of economic 
infrastructure in South Africa.  The strategic nature of the SoCs enables government to 
leverage limited budget appropriations by raising debt from the financial and capital 
markets.  The SoCs generally possess the requisite skills and capacity to manage the 
implementation of complex infrastructure projects.   
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As a result of the long history of the SoCs in raising debt finance, their participation in 
the development of economic infrastructure is the most appropriate and efficient for 
South Africa.  The cost of debt raised by the SoCs compares well or even better than 
that raised by most corporates and in certain cases even better than that raised by 
government.     
Since the SoC infrastructure programmes are generally medium to long term, their 
projects are generally exposed to a number of project risks such as demand, foreign 
exchange, interest rates and regulated tariff structures.  In response to these risks, 
SoCs have developed robust risk management processes and capacities.   
5.3.4 Development Contributions 
Although the use of this mechanism has been limited to a few known cases in South 
Africa, a number of institutions have questioned the appropriateness and efficiency of 
the mechanism.  Some of the skepticism includes the disposal of public assets, 
sometimes at the expense of social objectives, and the disproportionate benefit by the 
private sector in this mechanism.  The capacity and ability of public institutions to 
initiate, negotiate and manage projects financed through this mechanism is also a major 
obstacle in the utilisation of this mechanism. 
Despite its limited use and criticisms leveled against it, the mechanism is still important 
for the generation of long term sustainable revenues from surplus underutilised assets 
usually associated with public institutions. 
5.3.5 Public Private Partnerships 
The use of this mechanism has become the most preferred alternative to supplement 
budget appropriations for most of spheres of government.   There has however been a 
limited use of the mechanism within the SoCs since they are able to access various 
sources of finance and have capacity to implement such projects.  As a result of 
financial constraints, government has been calling for more private sector involvement 
in the development of infrastructure in the telecommunications, energy and transport 
sectors. 
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In instances where users have to pay directly for public infrastructure services, the 
mechanism is always criticised for its inefficiency and disproportionate benefit accruing 
to the private sector.  A classical example in South Africa was the resistance to the 
tolling of a highway improvement project.  Some users believed that the project could 
have been better financed through other mechanisms where the burden of infrastructure 
investment was not on a user pays principle. 
The growing number of PPP financed projects since the early 2000s has enabled the 
South African public sector to gain a substantial amount of skill and knowledge to 
manage these complex projects.  This trend will result in a substantial reduction in 
financing costs as both the public and private parties begin to understand each other’s 
role in the assumption and management of various project risks.         
5.3.6 Franchise Arrangements 
As noted by Chan et al (2009), this mechanism is appropriate where the public sector 
does not possess the skill to operate the infrastructure and where the existing 
infrastructure is operated inefficiently.  For new infrastructure, the authors argued that 
other mechanisms such as PPP are more appropriate.   
Whilst this mechanism offers substantial savings on financing costs, the public sector 
assumes a substantial amount of risk which could be better appropriated to the private 
sector.  Since the public sector takes leadership in the design, implementation and 
initiating the management contract with the private sector, delays resulting from 
inadequate skill and capacity of the public sector can have a substantial negative impact 
on the overall financing costs.   
Based on the case study observations, the public sector has generally preferred to use 
PPPs for new infrastructure and franchising arrangements to improve operational 
efficiencies on existing infrastructure, particularly for social facilities. 
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5.4 Consistency of Financing Framework 
The results from the multiple regression model showed that there is no relationship 
between the choice of a financing option (project finance or corporate finance) and any 
of the risk factors related to the implementation of the project, transaction costs or 
information asymmetry between the public sector and private investors/lenders. 
This finding suggests that there is no common framework that public sector institutions 
use to make decisions on the choice of an appropriate infrastructure financing 
mechanism, given an understanding of project risks, transaction cost risks and 
information asymmetry risks.   
An observation on the choice of the project finance mechanism (PPPs) also indicates 
no relationship between the choice and the risk factors.  This also implies that even with 
the use of the PPPs, the framework is not consistent across the case studies reviewed.  
It is however acknowledged that when a number of PPP case studies were initiated, 
there was no common framework that was available to guide the selection and use of 
this mechanism.  The implementing institutions largely relied on their discretion in the 
absence of uniform standards.    
Although some consistency has been observed, particularly with the implementation of 
office accommodation PPP projects, a lack of a framework still exists in the choice of 
other financing mechanisms.  The lack of a common financing mechanism framework 
and inconsistencies across the public sector result in risks which are ultimately factored 
in the financing costs of infrastructure by the private sector.   This results in costly and 
therefore inefficient financing of infrastructure development in South Africa.   
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CHAPTER 6 : FINANCING MECHANISM FRAMEWORK  
 
This chapter presents a proposed conceptual framework for the selection of an 
appropriate and efficient mechanism for financing public infrastructure investments in 
South Africa.  Calitz & Fourie (2007) stated that in financing public infrastructure, it is 
important that government does not assume an inappropriate role nor expects an 
inappropriate involvement of private business.  Inderst (2010) demonstrated that, like 
any asset, infrastructure investment decision is determined primarily by risk-return 
profile of a portfolio held by an investor.    
Griffith-Jones & de Lima (2004) stated that infrastructure finance subjects private 
investors to major risks and that the main concerns when structuring financing 
mechanisms is the way risk is perceived.  The authors defined risks as all the 
possibilities of delays or differences in returns to that which investors would receive if 
everything went according to plan.  
The conceptual framework proposed is founded on concepts extracted from the 
literature review and the assessment of South African public infrastructure projects 
studied and reported in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  The framework recommends a 
systematic and structured approach in the assessment of overall project risks.   
The assessed overall risk of a project implies a certain level and/or category of 
expected returns.  An efficient financing model, as stated by Chan et al (2009), is that 
which firstly acknowledges the risks associated with a project and then optimally 
allocates such risks to the parties that are best able to do so.  Having assessed the 
implied risk level/category, the model helps with the selection of a financing mechanism 
that is appropriate and efficient (i.e. reduces overall project financing costs).   
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In summary, the conceptual framework starts with the understanding of the assessed 
infrastructure needs which determine whether the infrastructure is of a social or 
economic nature or a combination of both.  This is followed by a process of classifying 
risks into categories related to project implementation, information asymmetry between 
public and private sectors, transaction cost factors and capacity of the public sector to 
facilitate and manage the implementation of the project.  
The classification is then followed by a detailed quantification of the identified risks 
using a qualitative but objective assessment tool.  The risk quantification yields a 
measure of the overall project risk, giving a qualitative indication of the expected return 
by potential investors of the project.  Based on the theory underpinning the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), the expected return is positively correlated to the overall project 
risk measure (score). 
In addition to the quantification of the overall project risk, the model recommends that 
factors such as legislative or policy restrictions, that may have an impact on the choice 
of a financing mechanism need to be considered.  Such considerations may take 
precedence over the mechanism recommended through the project risk score alone. 
Figure 6.1 shows a schematic representation of the proposed conceptual framework 
and Appendix D shows the framework as used for the quantification of a project risk 
score. 
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Figure  6.1  :  Infrastructure Financing Conceptual Framework as conceptualised by the author 
 
 
62 
 
The following is a brief description of the key parameters of the framework. 
6.1 Needs Assessment 
The need for infrastructure will be determined from a project feasibility study conducted 
by an institution responsible for the development of the infrastructure and the delivery of 
the public good or service.  It is assumed that the feasibility study, its stages and 
outputs are conducted through industry best practices, prescribed guidelines or 
regulations.    
6.2 Infrastructure Type 
The identification of the need and the output of the feasibility study will indicate the type 
(i.e. social or economic infrastructure) that is required for the satisfaction of the 
identified need.  It is however acknowledged that for certain needs, it may not be 
immediately obvious under which category the infrastructure project will be classified.   
A typical example where this may require a closer analysis is on the provision of public 
transport infrastructure to poor communities.  Whilst this infrastructure may initially 
provide mobility to the targeted communities, the project may also open up new 
economic opportunities to the recipients and potential business investors.  However, in 
the provision of social services such as health and education, the infrastructure is easily 
categorised under the social infrastructure category. 
6.3 Risk Classification 
The framework, in line with the literature review, proposes that the overall risk of a 
public infrastructure investment project is critical in determining an appropriate financing 
mechanism.  The determination of a risk category of a project enables the estimation of 
a likely/expected investment return by potential investors and/or funders of the project.   
The framework proposes the classification of risk into project related risks, information 
asymmetry risk, transaction cost factor risks and the ability/capability of the public sector 
institution to manage the implementation of the project.  Each of the risk classes is 
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allocated a weighting which is based on the unique circumstances of the project and 
other factors. 
6.4 Risk Identification and description 
In order to identify manageable risks, each of the risk classes identified above is 
subdivided into sub-classes.  The nature of each risk is described as comprehensive as 
possible so as to develop an objective and accurate measurement and management 
strategy.  The proposed sub-classes can be customised to suit projects implemented by 
different institutions and/ or investors or lenders.  
6.5 Risk Quantification 
The framework proposes the use of a Likert scale (1 to 5) to quantify the level of risk to 
be allocated to a sub-class.  The scale is generically designed to quantify the risk level 
as follows : 1 = very low; 2 = low; 3 = average; 4 = high and 5 = very high.  Each of the 
risk sub-classes is allocated a weighting within its class to take into account unique 
project related factors.  
Although the scale is subjective and qualitative in nature, it allows for a uniform rating of 
risk across different projects and also allows for a rating of the same project by different 
assessors using a common instrument.  This allows for objective risk assessment which 
is often difficult to obtain, particularly when a project is assessed by people from 
different backgrounds or with diverse interests on the project.   
6.6 Risk Allocation 
Based on the literature review, the most efficient financing mechanism is the one that 
diversifies and allocates the risks of a project to the parties that are best able to carry.   
Once the project risks have been identified and quantified, it is important that the public 
and private sector institutions understand clearly the nature and level of risks the other 
party is prepared to assume in the implementation of the project throughout its life-
cycle.   
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The framework therefore allows for a transparent process where each party is clear on 
the nature and level of risk each party is carrying on the project.  This framework could 
also be used to facilitate negotiations among parties and thereby reduces unnecessary 
delays on the implementation of the project.  Most importantly, it allows for a more 
transparent costing of the financing costs based on the allocation of risk carried by each 
party.  
6.7 Total Risk Score 
On completion of the detailed assessment of the risks, the framework calculates an 
overall risk score which can then be used to categorise the project risk on a similar 
Likert Scale level i.e. very low, low, average, high or very high risk level.     
6.8 Regulatory Considerations 
Provisions of a number of legislations and regulations such as the PFMA, MFMA and 
PPP Guidelines need to be considered before a final decision is made on the choice of 
a financing mechanism.   The provisions will determine and/or guide the final choice of 
the mechanism and the administrative and legal processes to be followed to implement 
such a choice. 
6.9 Recommended Financing Mechanism 
The framework recommends different financing mechanisms for different overall project 
risk categories.  The framework proposes a 'pecking order' ranking of financing 
mechanism in this order: the lowest risk project (category 1) is financed through 
government appropriations or SoC balance sheet, followed by category 2 financed 
through franchising, category 3 financed through specific borrowing bonds, category 4 
through development contributions and the highest risk projects (category 5) financed 
through PPP mechanisms. 
Acknowledging that the proposed order may not always be appropriate, the framework 
allows institutions to develop their financing order based on their portfolio of projects 
and risk appetite.  In addition, the framework allows for the other qualitative 
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considerations such as legislative/regulatory constraints that may restrict the use of 
certain financing mechanisms for certain projects.  Combining the calculated overall 
project risk score with other qualitative considerations, an institution or private 
investor/funder can make an overall recommendation on the appropriate and efficient 
financing mechanism. 
6.10 General 
This proposed framework provides the public and private sector an objective platform 
for an effective and transparent assessment of critical risks associated with the 
implementation of public infrastructure projects.  Acknowledging that this research is the 
first of its kind in South Africa, it therefore provides an informed platform for further 
research in various areas of infrastructure financing to improve on the proposed 
framework. 
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CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSIONS 
  
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this research was to determine key financing mechanisms, their 
appropriateness and efficiency in financing public infrastructure investments in South 
Africa.  A further objective of the research was to propose a conceptual framework to be 
used by public sector institutions to select appropriate financing mechanisms for various 
public infrastructure projects.  
Since the research is conceptual in nature, a multiple case study methodology was 
adopted to find responses to the research questions.  A number of public infrastructure 
projects implemented by various public sector institutions were analysed to determine 
the key financing mechanisms and their appropriateness for different infrastructure 
projects.  The case studies were also used to determine whether public sector 
institutions used a consistent framework to select appropriate financing mechanisms for 
the development of their infrastructure.   
Based on the literature review concepts and the analysis of case studies, a conceptual 
framework was proposed for use by public (and private) sector institutions to select 
appropriate and efficient financing mechanisms for the development of public 
infrastructure. 
7.2 Conclusions of the study 
The review of literature and the analysis of case studies provided insight to the 
questions raised at the beginning of the research.  The following is a summary of the 
findings of the research. 
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7.2.1 Financing Mechanisms 
The research found that, in line with the literature review, public infrastructure in South 
Africa is financed through budget appropriations, state-owned companies, development 
contributions, public private partnerships and franchising arrangements  
The research also found that budget appropriations remained the main source of 
financing, particularly for social infrastructure projects.  This mechanism is also used as 
equity contribution (shareholder loans) in cases where the balance sheet of an SoC is 
used to raise external loan finance and issuing of bonds.  In certain instances, budget 
appropriations were used to guarantee minimum project cash flows in complex PPP 
arrangements to either ensure financial viability of a project or reduce funding risk to 
private sector investors. 
The research further found that a significant proportion of investment in economic 
infrastructure is financed through SoC infrastructure programmes.  This results from a 
reality that all key economic infrastructure such as electricity, ports, freight rail, national 
toll roads, telecommunications, and bulk water infrastructure are under the 
custodianship of SoCs.    
Despite the evident importance of the development contribution (land value capture) 
mechanism for financing urban infrastructure and its capacity to generate additional 
revenue from under-utilised public sector assets, it seems to play an insignificant role in 
the development of public infrastructure.  The reluctance of some public sector 
institutions to utilise this mechanisms stems from the requirement for public sector to 
make long-term commitments which have delayed benefits.   
The skill set required to initiate and manage projects financed through this mechanism 
also pose a major constraint to its utilisation by many public sector institutions. 
The research found that the use of PPPs gained popularity since the late 1990s.    
Although the mechanism has been criticised for its high financing costs and 
disproportionately benefiting the private sector, there is a significant number social and 
economic infrastructure projects financed through this mechanism.  This growth in the 
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number of PPP projects has benefited the development of specialist project finance and 
management skill and capacity of the public sector.  There is still no significant 
utilisation of PPPs by SoCs in the delivery their economic infrastructure programmes.  
The franchising arrangement is a relatively new mechanism in the financing of public 
infrastructure in South Africa.  Where it has been utilised, the mechanism has been a 
variation of a PPP model where the private sector assumes operational risks of an 
existing infrastructure asset.  The development of public transport infrastructure projects 
and hospital operation projects are some examples that utilised this mechanism. 
Although the literature review highlighted the importance of specific purpose bonds, this 
mechanism is not generally used in South Africa.  There is however a significant use of 
general purpose bonds by a number of public institutions such as municipalities and 
state-owned companies.    
For developing economies, the literature review also highlighted the importance of 
funding provided by donor agencies and financial development institutions.  Although 
the research found a significant role financial development institutions (DFI) play in the 
financing of public infrastructure, there is an insignificant reliance on this funding source 
by the South African public sector and its institutions.  Where DFI funding is utilised, it is 
generally considered either as loan financing (by SoCs and municipalities) or part of 
government appropriations if the DFI is sourced directly by government. 
Although the utilisation of public infrastructure financing mechanisms in South Africa 
compares well with international benchmarks, there still exists opportunities in the use 
of specific purpose bonds.    
7.2.2 Appropriateness of Financing Mechanisms 
The research found that budget appropriations have been used to either finance social 
public infrastructure, provide equity contribution to SoC balance sheets and to facilitate 
project viability in order to attract private sector investment.  Given that the mechanism 
offers the lowest financing costs, the above-mentioned applications indicate that budget 
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appropriations have generally be used appropriately to finance public infrastructure 
investments. 
Since the mechanism is generally used at the sole discretion of government, it is not 
always the most appropriate and efficient in the absence of independent scrutiny of the 
financial market processes.  
Financing infrastructure development through SoC balance sheets has proved to be the 
most appropriate given the SoC skill base and ability to source financing from local and 
international markets.  Although the mechanism can be expensive during unfavorable 
credit ratings, the SoCs have succeeded in raising funding even during economic 
downturns.   
Although used in very limited cases, the development contributions mechanism 
considered in the research proved to be a critical source of urban infrastructure finance.  
The benefits of the mechanisms extend beyond the infrastructure financing to include 
benefits such as increase in investor confidence, sustainable job creation and 
regeneration of depressed areas, 
Although the PPP mechanism has been applied in appropriate projects, there is still a 
great need to improve on the capacity of the public sector to minimise potentially high 
financing costs associated with this mechanism.  As observed in the research the 
significant growth in the knowledge in managing the PPP processes will have a positive 
impact on the reduction of the total life-cycle financing costs. 
Based on the research findings, the use of the franchising arrangement mechanism has 
not been appropriate given the disproportionate assumption of risk by the public sector 
despite the participation of the private sector in the project.  Where the mechanism 
seemed appropriate and efficient is where the private sector was involved in the  
operational improvements on an existing infrastructure.       
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7.2.3 Financing Mechanism Framework 
The research found that there was a lack of a common framework used by public sector 
institutions to select appropriate and efficient financing mechanisms for the 
development of public infrastructure.   
Based on the analysis of case studies and literature review, a conceptual infrastructure 
financing framework was proposed. The conceptual framework proposes that, in 
addition to a structured approach to the assessment of project risks, factors external to 
the project such as the regulatory constraints, should be taken into account in choosing 
an appropriate financing mechanism.   
7.3 Recommendations 
Although the research has confirmed that South African public infrastructure financing 
mechanisms are comparable to international best practices, there is a need to develop 
public sector capacity to improve efficiencies in the mechanisms already in use.  
Furthermore, there is a need to focus on developing a conducive environment for the 
utilisation of specific purpose bonds and franchising arrangements.  
Although the proposed conceptual framework is based on exploratory research, it 
provides a useful basis to be used by public and private sector institutions as a common 
project financing assessment platform.  The framework will have a significant impact 
towards optimising project risk allocation, reducing information asymmetry, reducing 
transaction costs and strengthening public sector capacity thereby minimising costs of 
appropriate financing options.   
7.4 Suggestions for further research 
This exploratory research lays ground for further research into the following areas of 
public infrastructure financing : 
 A critique of the proposed conceptual public infrastructure financing framework 
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 Key determinants of private sector involvement in public infrastructure 
investments 
 Developing  a risk-return relationship of public infrastructure assets 
 Risk allocation and its impact on the reduction of public infrastructure financing 
costs 
 Critical success factors for the development of a specific-purpose bond market in 
Africa 
 Quantitative comparison of project life cycle costs of various financing 
mechanisms 
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CHAPTER 8   
APPENDIX A :  FINANCING MECHANISM CASE STUDIES 
The following is a brief discussion of the twenty public infrastructure case studies 
considered in the research.  
The summary provided on each case is based on information obtained from a 
number of sources including technical reports, newspaper articles, journal articles, 
latest annual financial statements, informal interviews with industry experts and in a 
few instances discussions with personnel that were involved in the implementation 
of the projects.  The aim of using various information sources was to ensure that 
the information gathered was as complete and accurate as possible.   
The economic and social infrastructure projects reviewed span across a number of 
sectors such as social facilities, transport, energy and water.  For each case, a brief 
background to the project is provided followed by an overview of the financing 
mechanism adopted by the relevant implementing public or private sector 
institution.  Lastly, an overview of important features of the project is highlighted. 
Although each case presents its unique characteristics, there are a few common 
themes that underlie the cases considered.   These themes are analysed in detail 
in the body of the research report. 
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8.1 National Toll Road – Maputo Corridor (N4) 
8.1.1 Project Background 
During the mid-1990s, the governments of Mozambique and South Africa agreed on 
the development of a road linking the economic hubs of the two countries namely 
Maputo and Gauteng.  The N4 toll route runs over a distance of almost 600km 
between Gauteng (east of Pretoria) and the Port of Maputo in Mozambique, and 
operates six toll plazas along the route. 
Farlam (2005) noted that as a result of major road maintenance backlog in South 
Africa and war ravaged infrastructure in Mozambique, both governments faced fiscal 
constraints and did not have sufficient funding to finance the proposed toll road and 
related infrastructure projects.  The two governments therefore found the public private 
partnership (PPP) approach appealing.   
8.1.2 Financing Mechanism 
In 1996 the two governments entered into a 30-year concession with a private sector 
consortium to build, operate and transfer the infrastructure to governments. The total  
estimated contract cost of approximately R3 billion (at 1996 prices) was financed from 
20% equity and 80% debt. The equity investors included three construction firms, a 
South African Infrastructure Fund and a commercial bank.  Debt was raised from four 
South African Banks, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and a 
Pension Fund.    
8.1.3 Key Issues 
In order to minimise funding risks, both governments provided joint and several 
guarantees for the debt and under certain conditions also guaranteed equity.   Other 
than project specific risks, the project faced major demand risks as this was the first 
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major toll road project for both countries.  There was uncertainty as to whether the 
targeted users would be prepared to pay the toll fees or would rather use some of the 
then available alternative routes. Farlam (2005) stated that there was also 
considerable user payment risk in Mozambique as the poor communities were unable 
and unwilling to pay high toll fee.  This resulted in the cross-subsidisation of the 
Mozambican portion of the road with higher revenues from the South African side. 
Substantial discounts were also offered to regular and local users of public transport 
on both sides of the border.  
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8.2 National Toll Road – Bakwena Platinum Corridor (N4) 
8.2.1 Project Background 
The concession contract to design, build, finance, operate and maintain the Bakwena 
N1/N4 toll road was finalised in August 2001.  The toll road consists of a 95 kilometer 
section of the N1 running from Pretoria northwards to the town of Bela Bela 
[Warmbaths] and a 290 kilometer section of the N4 running from Pretoria westwards to 
the Botswana border.  During the first four years of the concession, the concessionaire 
was required to undertake a series of initial construction works that included the 
upgrading of the existing roads and the construction of two new sections of the N4.  
8.2.2 Financing Mechanism 
The cost of the initial construction works was approximately R 3 billion funded by the 
South African Infrastructure Fund and COFIDES (Spain) as the major non-sponsor 
shareholders.   The funding for the project was initially raised from the private sector. 
The shareholders committed R700 million and 5 South African and international 
banking institutions arranged the R 2.3 billion structured lending facilities. 
The project was refinanced in June 2009 and this resulted in a change of shareholding 
with the foreign and local contractors divesting their shareholding to the remaining 
financial institutional shareholders. 
8.2.3 Key Issues 
After the initial construction works were completed and traffic patterns established, the 
construction shareholders divested and sold their shareholding to the remaining 
financial institutional shareholders.  The toll road is being operated and maintained by 
a special purpose company comprising South African and international toll operators.    
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8.3 National Toll Road – Cedara to Heidelburg (N3) 
8.3.1 Project Background 
The National Route (N3) is one of the most important commercial roads in South 
Africa, carrying freight and acting as a tourism conduit between the two most important 
provinces in South Africa, namely Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal.  In November 1999, 
the South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) awarded a 30-year 
concession to a private sector consortium to design, construct, operate, maintain and 
finance the 420 km section of the N3 route between Cedara in KwaZulu-Natal and 
Heidelberg in Gauteng.     
8.3.2 Financing Mechanism 
The concessionaire was to finance, upgrade  existing sections of the route, construct 
new sections and repair & maintain the route over the concession period.   This 
commitment, amounting to approximately R10 billion over the concession period was 
financed through a combination of equity funding, debt finance and cash generated 
internally from the concessionaire's operations.  The financing strategy seeks an 
optimum solution for the concessionaire while providing the equity investors and 
lenders with acceptable returns. 
8.3.3 Key Issues 
The main project risks included potential delays in obtaining necessary environmental 
permits, additional construction costs incurred through the realignment of existing 
sections and mitigation works. The risk related to potential delay in obtaining 
environmental permits for the initial construction works was however considered to be 
low as the concessionaire had addressed all the relevant issues supported by detailed 
specialist studies and associated design changes. 
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8.4 Government Office Accommodation  – Trade and Industry 
8.4.1 Project Background 
This was the first government office accommodation project to be approved by the 
National Treasury as a PPP project under the Public Finance Management Act 
(PFMA). 
The Department of Trade and Industry entered into a 25 year concession contract with 
a private sector consortium to provide a campus that would be a fully-serviced, world-
class facility to contribute significantly to the efficiency and efficacy of the department.  
The campus houses the departmental officials as well as many of the agencies that 
report to the department.  The project involved the construction of seven 3-storey 
buildings with a total floor area of approximately 44 000m2.  In addition, the 
concessionaire was to provide a comprehensive range of facilities management (FM) 
services including, among others cleaning, maintenance, security and the installation 
of commercial tenants.  The R500 million project commenced in February 2003 and 
was completed in August 2004.    
8.4.2  Financing Mechanism 
In terms of the PPP agreement, the concessionaire was contracted to design, build, 
finance and operate the campus over a period of 25 years from August 2003.  In 
return, the department makes monthly unitary payments to the concessionaire to 
cover the costs of providing the facilities management service and service debt.     
The project was financed through 80% debt and 20% equity of which 12% was the 
contribution by government.   It is estimated that the present value (as at 2003) of the 
unitary payment over the period of the concession will be R870 million.  The major 
benefit to government is that at the end of the concession period, the ownership of the 
land and improvements revert back to government. 
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8.4.3 Key Issues 
The benefit of the PPP is that it allowed the government department to transfer its 
property ownership and management responsibilities to a private sector party enabling 
the department to focus on its core functions.  Another significant value-for-money 
consideration to the department was the immediate construction of additional office 
space as an integral part of the campus to meet future expansions.    
The contract was concluded at a fixed price that was escalated on an index linked to 
the national inflation rate. The facilities management (FM) service delivery was set to 
meet stringent standards that included penalties in cases where the minimum 
standards were not met by the FM company.    
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8.5 Government Office Accommodation  – Basic Education 
8.5.1 Project Background 
The Department of Basic Education (DoBE) entered into a PPP agreement with a 
private sector concessionaire for the design, construction, finance, operation and 
maintenance of its head office in 2007.  In summary, the project involved the 
construction of a 30 000m² office space to accommodate approximately 1 200 
employees of the department.   
 The project was based on a 27-year contract period that included two years of 
construction period and 25 years of operations. The operations included the provision 
of a comprehensive facilities management (FM) services which are provided at pre-
determined service levels.   The construction of the facility was completed at the end 
of February 2010 and operations commenced in March 2010. 
8.5.2 Financing Mechanism 
The R403 million project was funded through 90% debt and 10% equity by the 
concessionaire.  The debt portion was arranged and underwritten by a local 
commercial bank.  According to the PPP concession agreement, the department pays 
a  unitary fee, which escalates annually in line with CPI.  The fee is used to pay for the 
operating costs, debt and the return to investors. 
8.5.3 Key Issues 
The advantage of the PPP arrangement is that the department focusses its attention 
on its core business and all property management issues are taken care of by the 
concessionaire.  Whilst the concessionaire makes a return on its investment during the 
contract, government benefits when it assumes ownership of the asset at the end of 
the end of the concession period.  
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8.6 Bloemfontein and Louis Trichardt Prisons 
8.6.1 Project Background 
During the late 1990s, when government faced a significant shortage of prison 
facilities, the departments of Correctional Services (DCS) and Public Works (DPW) 
developed a model, Asset Procurement and Operating Partnership Systems (APOPS), 
wherein the private sector designs, finances, builds and operates a prison facility over 
a long-term concession period.    
In 2000, the DPW signed a two separate 25 year concession contracts with the private 
sector operators of the prisons located in Bloemfontein and Louis Trichardt.  The 
facilities hold approximately 3,000 inmates each and were fully operational in 2002.  A 
review conducted a year after the commencement of operations found that the prisons 
provided significantly higher quality facilities and levels of service than the public 
prisons and that the operating costs per prisoner per day were comparable with those 
of the public sector prisons. 
8.6.2 Financing Mechanism 
The total construction costs were approximately R1.7 billion (Bloemfontein) and R1.8 
billion (Louis Trichardt) respectively in (2000 prices).  Each facility was financed 
through equity from concessionaire shareholders and debt raised from both foreign 
and local financial institutions. 
8.6.3 Key Issues 
The high interest rates, high expected returns, high perceived project risks and high 
sovereign risks at the time the concession contracts were concluded resulted in high 
project financing costs.  A review done by the National Treasury on these projects 
highlighted a number of critical factors that have to be taken into account in the 
implementation of such major projects.  Among others, the lessons included public 
sector capacity and skill to negotiate PPP projects, timing of the implementation of 
such major projects and capital and financial market conditions.    
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As a result of these experiences, government subsequently adopted a step-by-step 
process to PPPs, rigorously regulated by the National Treasury setting guidelines on 
project inception, feasibility study, procurement and contract management process 
with the main purpose of ensuring project value-for-money and appropriate risk 
transfer.   
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8.7 Water and Sanitation : ILembe District Municipality 
8.7.1 Project Background 
The substantial growth in the demand for water and sanitation services and a 
simultaneous deterioration of bulk infrastructure, presented the ILembe municipality 
with infrastructure investment and management challenges.  The municipality did not 
have adequate funding to upgrade and expand services and lacked the experience to 
provide comprehensive services.  In 1999, the municipality signed a 30-year 
concession contract with a private sector company.   
The contract required the private sector company to oversee, manage and implement 
the provision of water and sanitation services within the municipal boundary which had 
a population of approximately 45 000 people with a mix of extremes of wealth and 
poverty.  As a result of South Africa’s local government demarcation and municipal 
restructuring process in the early 2000s, the population of the municipality increased 
to approximately 600 000 people.
  
8.7.2 Financing Mechanisms 
The concessionaire was responsible for the upgrade and investment of water and 
sanitation infrastructure to higher levels of service.  In return the concessionaire was 
responsible for collecting revenue from the households to cover the investment and 
required returns over the period of the concession.   
8.7.3 Key Issues 
Partly as a result of a 20% increase in the cost of bulk water in 2001, the 
concessionaire found itself unable to sustain the quality of services without a 
substantial adjustment of the tariff to the consumers.  A performance review of the 
concession conducted in 2005 found that, whilst the service quality targets had been 
achieved in the wealthier areas, those in poor areas were not met.   
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The poorer communities were expressing considerable frustration at receiving a lower 
level of service than they expected.  The review had revealed that although initially the 
concessionaire had focused on improving the quality of service in poorer areas,  non-
payment by many households in these areas led to cut-offs and a reversion to lower 
quality service levels.   
On average, tariffs for higher service level customers had increased by 119% from 
pre-concession levels and 80% for poorer customers.   Despite these challenges, the 
other areas of infrastructure upgrade such as the reduction of water losses, water 
purity, leakages and the number of faulty meters had improved substantially.    
Notwithstanding the improvements in infrastructure and service delivery, there were 
many criticisms leveled at both the concessionaire and the municipality.  For example, 
in the first year after the concessionaire took over, there were cases of cholera 
resulting from people drawing unhygienic water from streams rather than paying for 
treated water as the poor people in the area were not cushioned from the impact of 
tariff increases. 
Although in 2001, national government approved a policy to give each family 6 000 
litres of free water, the policy had not been applied to those on lower service levels 
using prepaid meters, arguably the most needy customers and poor.  To the contrary, 
the wealthier customers, were benefiting from the free basic water policy as a result of 
poor administrative processes by the municipality and the concessionaire 
The contract did not anticipate changes to municipal boundaries or high non-payment 
rates.   As a result the deal would have collapsed if the municipality had not cushioned 
the concessionaire from failure.
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8.8 Inkosi  Chief Albert Luthuli Hospital  
8.8.1 Project Background 
The Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital (IALCH) is an 850-bed hospital built in 1996 
on behalf of the KwaZulu Natal Department of Health (KZN DoH) to provide central 
hospital services to approximately 12 million referred patients.  
In 2001, the KZN DoH entered into a 15 year concession agreement with a private 
party to supply, maintain, repair and upgrade of medical equipment, information 
management & technology and facilities management to support the operations of the 
hospital.   
8.8.2 Financing Mechanisms 
The concessionaire invested approximately R1.2 billion and the KZN DoH contracted 
to pay a unitary fee of approximately R305 million per annum (adjusted for inflation) 
over the concession period.  
8.8.3 Key Issues 
The private party was concerned about the shortage of certain critical skills required 
for the commissioning and operation of specialist equipment and provision of certain 
services for the hospital.  In order to minimise this risk, the parties agreed that urgent 
efforts should be made to increase the supply of critical skilled workers to overcome 
potential staffing deficits. 
The project created and retained approximately 3 000 jobs and resulted in R360 
million cost savings whilst delivering a state-of-the art hospital facility. 
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8.9 Humansdorp Hospital 
8.9.1  Project Background 
The need for the project arose from a rapid population growth in the area surrounding 
the existing Humansdorp hospital resulting in a shortage of hospital beds.  There was 
also an urgent need to upgrade the existing hospital facility and improving the 
collection of revenue.   
In 1999, the Eastern Cape Department of Health (ECDoH) initiated a PPP process to 
identify a private company to partner with the department to implement the necessary 
upgrades and introduce operational efficiencies to the hospital.  The process was 
finally concluded in 2003 with the appointment of a private partner that would refurbish 
and establish a private health facility within the existing hospital, provide general 
facilities management services, share revenue generated from the operations with the 
ECDoH and achieve socio-economic benefits to local communities. 
8.9.2 Financing Mechanisms 
The ECDoH invested R1.5 million to the project and the private party contributed 
approximately R13 million.  
8.9.3 Key Issues 
Since the project was initiated before the promulgation of the Treasury Regulations on 
PPPs, the process of selecting a private party experienced a number of challenges.  
Despite these challenges, the PPP became a catalyst for further private sector 
participation in the provision of high quality health services in the Eastern Cape.  The 
development contributed to the growth in local economic development and the 
creation of more employment opportunities.  
As a result of a lack of guidelines in the implementation of PPPs, the private party took 
over some of the risks that it was not adequately compensated for.    
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8.10 Pelonomi – Universitas Hospital  
8.10.1 Project Background 
In 2000, the Free State Department of Health (FS DoH) embarked on a process to 
identify private parties that would partner with the department to improve the condition 
and quality of health services at the two underutilised hospitals namely Pelonomi and 
Universitas in Bloemfontein.   
Shuping & Kabane (2007) stated that the hospitals were suitable for the establishment 
of independent private hospitals using their surplus infrastructure through a co-location 
model of public-private partnerships.  The authors defined co-location as a type of 
PPP which occurs when the public and private sectors operate a similar service and 
collaborate rather than compete, resulting in the receipt of revenue by the public 
sector and the generation of profit by the private sector in a win-win enterprise. It 
occurs where the public sector has redundant assets and the private sector has sound 
commercial reasons for the utilisation of the excess government assets. 
Prior to the initiation of the PPP process, the FSDoH had three hospitals namely 
Universitas, Pelonomi and National which, prior to 1994 served communities on the 
basis of the patients' racial classification.  As part of transforming and de-racialising 
the provision of health care services, the department had to address the challenges of 
duplication, inefficiency and inequity inherited from the apartheid period.  The 
transformation process resulted in National Hospital becoming a district level hospital, 
Pelonomi Hospital becoming a regional level hospital and Universitas Hospital 
becoming a tertiary level hospital for the province.  
The transformation process resulted in the reduction in the number of beds from 2 100 
to 1 600 and some public hospitals were left with excess infrastructure that was 
grossly underutilised.  This excess capacity presented the public sector with an 
opportunity and a basis for contracting with the private sector. 
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8.10.2 Financing Mechanisms 
In November 2003, the FSDoH entered into a 20 year concession agreement with a 
private party to operate an unused ward at the Universitas Hospital as a private 
hospital.  In terms of the concession agreement, the private party was expected to 
invest capital towards the upgrading of the ward and related infrastructure.  In addition 
to retaining the ownership of upgraded infrastructure, the FSDoH would receive a 
percentage of the turnover generated by the private hospital.  
Shuping & Kabane (2007) noted that at end 2006, the private party had invested a 
total of R70.9 million and the FSDoH a total of R11 million.  In 2007, the FS DoH had 
received a total of R9.58 million in revenue since the start of the concession. 
8.10.3 Key Issues 
Beyond the financial benefits to the public and private sector partners, the project had 
significant socio-economic benefits which would not have been possible given the 
limited annual budgetary allocations in the public sector.  The partnership also resulted 
in the creation of temporary and permanent jobs by the hospital and sub-contracted 
services.    
Shuping & Kabane (2007:157) concluded that "In this co-location project, the public 
sector has been able to maximise the utilisation of its assets for the highest returns 
with the private sector gaining ‘additional’ beds and income". 
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8.11 Electricity Capacity Expansion Programme 
8.11.1 Project Background 
Eskom is a wholly State Owned Company (SoC) primary electricity supplier which 
generates, transmits and distributes electricity to industrial, mining, commercial, 
agricultural, businesses, residential and municipalities.  Eskom’s business covers the 
entire electricity value chain from the construction of infrastructure, operation and 
maintenance of facilities and the sale of the electricity.  
Since 2005, Eskom has been implementing its major capital expansion programme to 
increase the country's generation and transmission capacity to meet the growing 
demand for energy.  When completed, two of the deliverables, Kusile and Medupi 
power stations, will be the third and fourth largest coal-fired power plants respectively 
in the world.   
8.11.2 Financing Mechanisms 
The total cost of the capacity expansion programme from 2012/13 to 2018/19 is 
estimated to be R340 billion.  In order to fund the 2010/17 expansion programme, 
Eskom raised 77% of the R300 billion requirement from a number of external sources 
such as bonds (30%), commercial paper (23%), development finance institutions 
(21%), export credit agencies (11%), government loans (7%) and other sources (8%).  
8.11.3 Key Issues 
Eskom (2012) stated that the negative sovereign rating outlook by major ratings 
agencies on South Africa during 2011/12 resulted in the revision of Eskom’s outlook to 
negative. Although this did not have an immediate impact, it was likely to affect 
Eskom's borrowing costs in future.  In order to minimise its borrowing costs, Eskom 
explored other sources of funding, including Islamic bond finance, preference shares 
and retail bonds. 
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8.12 Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Programme 
8.12.1 Project Background 
The Department of Energy (2011) stated that the significant expansion of the South 
African economy during the past few decades resulted in a substantial increase in the 
demand for electricity without the necessary growth in the supply side.  Given that 
more than 90% of electricity in South Africa is generated from burning fossil fuel, the 
Department of Energy (DoE) promulgated an Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) which 
proposes the implementation of an 18GW renewable energy programme over the next 
20 years. 
In line with the IRP, government initiated the first phase of the programme where the 
independent power producers (IPPs) are expected to fund 3 725 megawatts (MW) of 
infrastructure on a long term concession basis. The programme is aimed at 
implementing various renewable energy technologies including onshore wind (1 850 
MW), concentrated solar thermal (200 MW), solar photovoltaic (1 450 MW), biomass 
(12.5 MW), biogas (12.5 MW), landfill gas (25 MW), small hydropower (75 MW) and 
small projects (100 MW). 
8.12.2 Financing Mechanisms 
In terms of this IPP Procurement Programme, the bidders are required to bid on tariff 
and the identified socio-economic development objectives.  The tariff will be payable 
by Eskom on conclusion of a power purchase agreement (PPA) with successful 
independent power producers.  
As at the end of May 2012, a total of 2 460 MW representing 66% of the total 
allocation had been awarded to 47 projects.  It is estimated that the investment on the 
projects will be in excess of R70 billion when each of the projects achieve the 
commercial operation stage.  The average concession period for each project is in 
excess of 15 years.   For each technology, the bidders were not allowed to bid a tariff 
in excess of a stipulated maximum amount. 
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8.12.3 Key Issues 
In addition to building additional green energy to the country's power pool, it is 
estimated that the first phase will create in excess of 25 000 temporary jobs during the 
development of projects and more than a thousand direct operational jobs.  Further to 
these, indirect jobs in other sectors e.g. manufacturing, building & construction, hotel 
accommodation will have long term benefits to local economies where these projects 
are implemented. 
Furthermore, it is the intention of government to utilise alternative funding sources 
such as carbon credits to support to the implementation of the renewable energy 
programme. 
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8.13 Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project 
8.13.1 Project Background 
During the early 2000s, the economic activity of Gauteng was developing beyond its 
road infrastructural capabilities.  This was evidenced by a substantial increase in 
increased congestion, and overloading of road infrastructure.    
In order to reduce the congestion and provide a road network that would further 
stimulate and support the economic development potential in the province, the South 
African National Roads Agency (Pty) Limited (SANRAL) proposed an improvement to 
the Gauteng freeway network.  The objective of the project was to upgrade and 
expand the existing network providing an interconnected network of inner and outer 
ring roads.    
Once completed, the initiative resulted in approximately 560 kilometers of upgraded 
and widened freeways connecting the key development nodes and previously 
neglected areas of the three metropolitan areas of Gauteng. 
8.13.2 Financing Mechanisms 
In accordance with the SANRAL Act (1998), the agency is responsible for two 
separate funding portfolios, namely toll and non-toll roads. These operations are 
funded separately without any cross-subsidisation between the two portfolios. Non-toll 
roads are funded through government appropriations and toll operations are funded 
either directly by SANRAL with outsourced operations or by private parties under PPP 
arrangements. 
SANRAL (2012:7) states that "according to its legislation and government policy, 
SANRAL promotes the user-pay principle through selective tolling to ensure the 
sustainability of the national road network. Using future revenue streams to build and 
maintain infrastructure is an effective project funding tool." 
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Since the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP) was implemented on a PPP 
basis, the network will operate on an open-road tolling system with revenue collected 
and utilised in order to improve the road infrastructure and service the debt and 
returns expected by the concessionaire.   
8.13.3 Key Issues 
It is estimated that, on completion, the GFIP contributed R29 billion to the country's 
GDP and created approximately 30 000 direct jobs during construction.  Nearly R4 
billion (41% of the total contract expenditure), was allocated to small, emerging and 
black-owned enterprises.     
Since the promulgation of the tariffs in April 2012, the project was faced with 
resistance and legal challenges from a number of civic and business organisations.  
This led to the overall downgrading of SANRAL by a number of rating agencies such 
as Moody's.  This led to government delaying the implementation of the tolling system, 
re-opening the public consultation process and providing bridging finance and 
guarantees to ensure that the contracted repayments to the concessionaire were 
honoured by SANRAL. 
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8.14 Airports Capacity Expansion Programme 
8.14.1 Project Background 
The Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA) is an independent company which is 
majority owned by the South African Government.  ACSA completed most of its 
infrastructure capacity development and improvement programme in 2010, largely to 
ensure the readiness of South Africa to host the 2010 Soccer World Cup competition. 
8.14.2 Financing Mechanisms 
ACSA (2012) stated that the capital expenditure since 2006 was financed largely 
through debt of R16.6 billion consisting of long term bonds (60%), commercial loans 
(20%), development finance institutions (17%) and commercial paper (9%),     
ACSA has two sources of revenue namely, aeronautical and non-aeronautical.  The 
former is derived from regulated income such as passenger service, aircraft landing 
and parking charges and the latter is from commercial activities.  
In line with the considerable increase in investments, ACSA applied for a 40.7% 
increase in tariffs to enable the business to finance the substantial increase in 
financing and operational costs associated with the completed infrastructure. 
Unfortunately, the promulgated increase was limited to 33%, much lower than 
expected, resulting in a significant shortfall in earnings to offset the increase in costs.  
Despite this, the company experienced solid revenue streams from both aeronautical 
and non-aeronautical activities coupled with a better air traffic movement mix during 
the World Cup period.    
8.14.3 Key Issues 
ACSA (2012) stated that its infrastructure investment programme was appropriate, 
leading to significant socio-economic benefits.  ACSA further estimated that the three 
major international airports sustain about 300 000 jobs (direct and indirect) and that 
planned future developments, as a result of passenger and cargo growth, will result in 
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the creation of some 150 000 new jobs over the next 10 years, provided the envisaged 
infrastructure development plans are realised. 
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8.15 Freight Logistics Infrastructure Expansion Programme  
8.15.1 Project Background 
Transnet (2012) stated that over a number of decades, the company faced substantial 
underinvestment in its freight logistics infrastructure including rail, ports and liquid 
product pipelines.  This led to a breakdown in service delivery which resulted in a shift 
of the overall logistics from rail to road resulting in poor financial position of Transnet.  
This shift also caused significant overloading of the national road infrastructure 
resulting in damage estimated at R2 billion per annum.     
Transnet (2012) stated that in order to address the historical underinvestment and shift 
the substantial portion of the logistics chain from road to rail, the company 
implemented a turnaround and growth strategy which included  the establishment of 
specialized divisions, namely freight rail (freight transportation), rail engineering (rolling 
stock maintenance), ports authority (landlord for the port system), port terminals 
(managing port and cargo terminal operations) and pipelines (pumps and manages 
the storage of petroleum and gas products).    
Critical to the growth strategy, was the development of a 30-year infrastructure 
investment plan which provides a framework for the planning and development of the 
company's infrastructure to ensure that adequate capacity is created ahead of 
demand.   The plan is broken down into five-year capital investment plans (CIP) which 
are reviewed annually to ensure alignment to long term requirements and the strategic 
objectives of the company. 
8.15.2 Financing Mechanisms 
It is estimated that Transnet required in excess of R300 billion over a period of 8 years 
from 2012, to eradicate its infrastructure backlog and also position the company with 
the projected growth in demand for its services.   Between 2006 and 2012, Transnet 
invested approximately R116 billion.  Approximately 52% of the investment of R22.3 
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billion in 2012 was targeted at expansion programmes and the balance towards 
reducing the maintenance backlog. 
Transnet (2012) stated that since the first CIP of approximately R117 billion covering 
the period from 2012 to 2016 will not be sufficient to meet the needs of customers and 
the economy, private sector participation was therefore critical to bridge the 
investment gap.  The planned capital investment for 2012/13 amounted to R21,5 
billion which was the most significant investment in a financial year reflecting the 
company's commitment to providing a responsive infrastructure to satisfy the demands 
of a growing economy.  As at 31 March 2012, the company’s borrowings amounted to 
R58 billion down from R60 billion in 2011.    
8.15.3 Key Issues 
Transnet raises its capital investment sources from a number of sources including 
bond issues & commercial paper (66%), commercial loans (33%) from local and 
financial institutions and 1% from other sources.    
The capital investment programme has a substantial portion of plant and equipment 
sourced from foreign suppliers which causes a substantial risk exposure to interest 
rate and foreign currency fluctuations. 
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8.16 Gautrain High-Speed Rail Project 
8.16.1 Project Background 
The Gautrain Project is a state-of-the-art rapid rail network in Gauteng comprising of a 
link between Pretoria and Johannesburg and between OR Tambo International Airport 
and Sandton. In addition to the three anchor stations on these two links, seven other 
stations are linked by approximately 80 kilometers of rail along the route. 
A private company holds a 15-year concession to design, build, part-finance and 
operates the Gautrain Rapid Rail Link project.  The concessionaire manages the client 
(Gauteng Provincial Government) interface and provides an integrated solutions 
approach for the PPP project.   
8.16.2 Financing Mechanisms 
The estimated project cost of R26 billion was funded through private sector equity of 
approximately 20% and 80% debt which consisted of 71% bank syndication and 9% of 
a floating rate mezzanine funding facility.   The financial transactions for the project 
were underpinned by a number of security mechanisms which guaranteed the 
performance of the concessionaire covering retentions, performance bonds and 
collateral agreements.   
8.16.3 Key Issues 
The careful structuring of responsibilities and the allocation of risk to parties in the 
PPP were aimed at ensuring that the project would be developed within the originally 
negotiated cost and avoid a threat of huge financial over-runs.  The project was also 
structured to ensure that government and the concessionaire operate within a strict set 
of financial parameters which were designed to take account of the risk associated 
with the country's fluctuating macro-economic environment.   
The concessionaire therefore had to fix its costs by making use of currency and 
interest rate hedging in local and international markets to ensure the integrity and 
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profitability of the project.  However, in terms of the contract, adjustments of the base 
price for local expenditure at CPIX were allowed to mitigate the impact of increases in 
the local costs of wages, materials and other factors during the term of the contract. 
In order to ease the financial burden to the commuter and simultaneously make the 
project financially viable, government decided to make an equity contribution (funding 
balance) towards the required capital investment.  Given the uncertainty of the 
commuter ridership on the system, government committed to providing a bridging fund 
in case the revenue stream fell below a predetermined minimum level.  This guarantee 
increased the certainty of revenue generation probability of the project.     
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8.17 Coega Industrial Development Zone 
8.17.1 Project Background 
In order to advance economic growth, skills development and creation of sustainable 
jobs in South Africa, particularly the Eastern Cape, the Coega Development 
Corporation (CDC) was established as a wholly owned State Owned Company (SoC) 
subsidiary of government.  CDC is tasked with promoting investment in the Industrial 
Development Zone (IDZ) located north east of Port Elizabeth by providing enabling 
economic infrastructure which includes bulk infrastructure and investor driven 
commercial developments within the IDZ.   
In 2001, government pronounced the 50 to 75 year development of the IDZ covering 
11 500 hectares of land and the deep-water Port of Ngqurha.  The development 
commenced in 2002 with the construction of basic infrastructure and the US$250 
million deep-water port.  The CDC started to attract local and international investors to 
the IDZ.  Despite the slowdown of investment as a result of the effects of the global 
financial crisis of 2007/08, the IDZ has been able to attract investment in excess of 
R50 billion.  
8.17.2 Financing Mechanisms 
The CDC is fully funded by government and relies in part on its revenue generating 
capacity to implement some of its mandatory objectives.   This reliance on government 
without external borrowing from other sources has proved to be a major constraint to 
the growth of CDC and consequently the development of the IDZ.  In 2012, 
government funding amounted to R336 million, a substantial reduction compared to 
R626 million in the previous year.   Excluding the government subsidy, revenue has 
increased substantially from R10 million in 2004 to R220 million in 2012. 
108 
 
8.17.3 Key Issues 
Although the CDC has experienced financial constraints, it has been able to attract 
critical industries to invest in the IDZ.  At end of 2012, the total value of operating 
investments within the IDZ amounted to R15 billion, consisting of alternative energy, 
downstream metals and auto manufacturing & components.   
Since it commenced with its investment promotion activities, the CDC has entered into 
various lease agreements with investors and estimates the total value of projects in 
the pipeline at R140 billion.     
 
  
109 
 
8.18 Dube Trade Port 
8.18.1 Project Background 
Established in 2001 as a public entity of the KwaZulu Natal (KZN) province, the Dube 
Trade Port Corporation (DTPC) is mandated to develop the Dube Trade Port, 
undertake or invest in projects associated with the port in order to facilitate economic 
growth in the province, attract long term investment and facilitate exports and imports.   
The Dube Trade Port (DTP) is an inland port strategically located between the two 
largest sea-harbours namely Richards Bay on the north and Durban on the south.  
The development combines an international airport, a dedicated cargo terminal, 
warehousing, offices, a retail sector, hotels and an agricultural area. 
8.18.2 Financing Mechanisms 
The total development of the first phase of the 60-year master plan is estimated to be 
R10 billion including the new airport estimated at R7 billion.  The airport infrastructure 
was financed by ACSA and completed in May 2010 in time for the start of the FIFA 
Soccer World Cup competition.  The infrastructure was financed through equity 
contributions from the KZN province and loans (raised by ACSA). 
8.18.3 Key Issues 
DTPC (2012) estimated that construction activities between 2007 and 2012  created 
more than 16 500 direct employment opportunities and contributed approximately R11 
billion to the GDP of the country's economy.  Of this amount, an estimated R2,4 billion 
was as a direct consequence of construction activity at Dube Trade Port. 
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8.19 Rapid Public Transport System : City of Johannesburg 
8.19.1 Project Background 
In 2007, the National Department of Transport (DoT) developed a strategy for the 
implementation of integrated rapid public transport networks (IRPTN) within major 
metropolitan areas of Johannesburg, Cape Town, eThekwini, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni 
and Nelson Mandela Bay.   
The objective of the project is to introduce a road-based mass transit public 
transportation system that is accessible, safe, convenient and affordable to 
communities that have no access to quality public transport services.   Where a 
planned IRPTN route coincides with services offered by other public transport 
operators such a municipality is obliged to negotiate a partnership with those 
operators.  In terms of the project guidelines, a municipality is responsible for the 
design and construction of the infrastructure required for the successful 
implementation of the project.   
The municipality is also responsible for the establishment of operating companies (e.g. 
vehicle and/or depot and/or station management and/or facilities management and/or 
fare management entities) in consultation with the affected public transport operators.   
In line with the DoT strategy objectives, the City of Johannesburg was the first 
municipality to implement the project for completion of the first phase in June 2009 to 
coincide with the hosting of the FIFA Confederations Cup tournament.  The first phase 
of the project involved the construction of approximately 26 kilometers of dedicated 
bus routes, 30 stations, 2 depots, a control centre and a purchase of more than 200 
buses.   
The municipality established a vehicle operating company (VOC) initially co-owned by 
the municipality and public transport operators.  The VOC is responsible for the 
operations of the buses and the municipality is responsible for the maintenance of the 
infrastructure and the collection of commuter fares.    
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8.19.2 Financing Mechanisms  
The cost (approximately R4.6 billion) of the first phase of the project, including the 
purchase of the buses was financed from a government grant.  Through a service 
level agreement, the municipality contracts the VOC to provide the public transport 
service on its behalf.  The VOC charges the municipality a fee based on an agreed 
time schedule and distance travelled.  The fee charged by the VOC takes into account 
that the infrastructure is made available by the municipality 'free of charge'.  The 
municipality also determines the fares to be charged to the VOC and subsidises any 
shortfall between the fee charged by the VOC and the fares collected from the 
commuters.   
8.19.3 Key Issues 
Since the project was the first of its kind and implemented under very strict deadlines, 
a number of lessons have emerged.  Whilst the project enabled a number of 
communities to access a safe and predictable public transport service, the municipality 
was burdened with a substantial number of risks including construction, financial and 
operational.  Also, despite the initial pre-feasibility projections, the project cannot be 
operated on a sustainable basis without a substantial subsidy from government. 
During the negotiation process, the municipality assumed substantial risks related to 
the purchase of buses and providing a guarantee for minimum revenue to the private 
sector owned VOC.  
Mokonyama (2012) reported that the construction of the first of the project created in 
excess of 14 000 jobs and 870 during the operations of the system.  The author 
mentioned that the maximum number of passenger trips exceeded 1 million per day 
including approximately 10% of previous private vehicle users.   
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8.20 Durban Point Waterfront Development 
8.20.1 Project Background 
Over a number of years, the central business district (CBD) of Durban within the 
eThekwini Municipality experienced a decline in the quality of urban infrastructure as a 
result of the relocation of business enterprises to the north of Durban.  Despite the 
Port of Durban being the busiest in the country, its immediate environment declined in 
line with the degeneration of the CBD. 
During the late 1990s, an Asian international property developer approached the 
eThekwini municipality and other public sector institutions with a proposal to purchase 
and regenerate land around the Durban port precinct by investing in mixed-use 
developments such as residential apartments, hotels, office space, retail shops and a 
small craft harbour.  As a result of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, the 
development was delayed until the early 2000s.  
 Although the development of bulk infrastructure such as water, sanitation and 
electricity and few a private sector developments were completed by mid-2000s, the 
economic meltdown of the late 2000s delayed the commencement and/or completion 
of a number of developments.  These delayed developments were financed largely 
from international finance institutions which were affected by the 2007/08 economic 
meltdown. 
8.20.2 Financing Mechanisms 
In order to consolidate all land parcels and redevelop the port precinct, a PPP was 
formed between the international property development company and a Municipal 
Owned Entity (MoE). The PPP was structured as an equal equity SPV (called the 
Durban Point Development Company (DPDC)) between the MoE and the private 
developer. All land owned by the municipality within the precinct was then transferred 
to the DPDC to initiate the urban regeneration project.   
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It was estimated that, on completion, the regeneration project would be in excess of 
R4 billion of private sector investment.    The investment in bulk infrastructure and the 
development of the entertainment theme park (uShaka Marine World) by the DPDC in 
the early 2000s, raised a substantial interest in the private sector property 
development market.   
8.20.3 Key Issues 
At the end of 2006, DPDC had invested approximately R120 million in the upgrading 
of the infrastructure and had sold R190 million of development land to private sector 
investors.  On its own, the private sector had invested approximately R1 billion in 
development projects creating more than 5 000 construction jobs.   Some real estate 
values adjacent to the port precinct more than doubled and investor confidence 
increased, attracting both local and international investors. 
Although the project took long to materialise, with a substantial risk taken by both the 
municipality and the private sector, the project succeeded in boosting investor 
confidence and reviving tourism in the CBD. 
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APPENDIX B : FRAMEWORK OF RISK ANALYSIS 
For each case study, a risk factor namely; Project Risk, Transaction Cost and 
Information Asymmetry is sub-divided into sub-criteria.  Each sub-criterion is evaluated 
qualitatively as and assigned a Likert Scale rating of 1 (very low risk) or 2 (low risk) or 
3 (average risk) or 4 (high risk) or 5 (very high risk).  A simple average rating is then 
calculated for each Risk Factor, assuming that all sub-criteria carry the same weight.  
A risk score is then calculated by dividing the average rating by the maximum possible 
score (5). i.e.             
             
 
  
A Total Risk Score (TRS) for each project is then calculated assuming individual 
weights of the Risk Factors. 
                               
where 
TRSi = Total Risk Score for Project i 
PRSi = Project Risk Score for Project i 
TCRSi = Project Risk Score for Project i 
IARSi = Project Risk Score for Project i 
w1 = 0 < weight of Project Risk Score < 1 
w2 = 0 < weight of Transaction Cost Risk Score < 1 
w3 = 0 < weight of Information Asymmetry Risk Score < 1 
  w1 + w2 + w3 = 1 
For the purposes of the research, it was assumed that w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/3 
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The table below illustrates a typical evaluation for projects ranging from a very low risk 
to very high risk category. 
 
 
 
 
Rating Very Low Low Average High Very High
Score 1 2 3 4 5
Rating Very Low Low Average High Very High
Score 1 2 3 4 5
Rating Very Low Low Average High Very High
Score 1 2 3 4 5
Rating Very Low Low Average High Very High
Score 1 2 3 4 5
Rating Very Low Low Average High Very High
Score 1 2 3 4 5
Rating Very Low Low Average High Very High
Score 1 2 3 4 5
Rating Very Low Low Average High Very High
Score 1 2 3 4 5
Rating Very Low Low Average High Very High
Score 1 2 3 4 5
Average Rating 1.4 2.2 3.2 4.0 4.9
Risk Score 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Rating Very Short Short Average Long Very Long
Score 1 2 3 4 5
Rating Very Low High Average Low Very Low
Score 5 2 3 4 5
Rating Very Short Short Average Long Very Long
Score 1 2 3 4 5
Average Rating 2.33 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Risk Score 0.47 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Rating Very Low Low Average High Very High
Score 1 2 3 4 5
Risk Score 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.00
Weights
Project Risk 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%
Transaction Costs 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%
Information Assymetry 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%
Total Risk Score 0.32 0.41 0.61 0.80 0.99
Transaction Cost Risks
Information Assymetry
1 Level of (mis)understanding of risks
2 Adequacy of funding
3 Project delays
1 Time taken to contract
6 Social
7 Currency Exchange
8 Interest Rate
Demand
4 Political and Regulatory
5 Environmental
1 Construction
Average Risk 
Project
High Risk 
Project
Very High Risk 
Project
Very Low Risk 
Project
Low Risk 
Project
Project Risk
2 Operations
3
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APPENDIX C  :  CASE STUDY RISK SCORES 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Rating High Average Very High Average Low High High Very Low Low Low
Score 4 3 5 3 2 4 4 1 2 2
Rating High High High Average Low High Very High High Low Low
Score 4 4 4 3 2 4 5 4 2 2
Rating Very High High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low High High Very Low High
Score 5 4 2 1 1 1 4 4 1 4
Rating High Low Low Low Very Low Average High High High Low
Score 4 2 2 2 1 3 4 4 4 2
Rating High High Very High Average Average Low Low Very Low Low Very Low
Score 4 4 5 3 3 2 2 1 2 1
Rating Very High High Average Low Low Low Very High High Average High
Score 5 4 3 2 2 2 5 4 3 4
Rating Low Average Average Very Low Very Low Low Very Low Low Very Low Low
Score 2 3 3 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
Rating High Average Average Very Low Very Low Average Very Low Low Very Low Low
Score 4 3 3 1 1 3 1 2 1 2
Average Rating 4.1 3.4 3.3 2.0 1.7 2.9 3.3 2.9 2.2 2.6
Risk Score 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5
Transaction Costs
Rating Long Short Average Average Average Long Average Average Average Short
Score 4 2 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 2
Rating Very High Very High Very High Very High Very High Average Low Average High High
Score 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 3 2 2
Rating Average Average Average Short Very Short Average Average Average Short Very Short
Score 3 3 3 2 1 3 3 3 2 1
Average Rating 2.67 2.00 2.33 2.00 1.67 3.33 3.33 3.00 2.33 1.67
Risk Score 0.53 0.40 0.47 0.40 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.60 0.47 0.33
Information Assymetry
Rating High Average Average High Average Very Low Very Low Average Very Low Very Low
Score 4 3 3 4 3 1 1 3 1 1
Risk Score 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2
Total Risk Score 0.72 0.56 0.58 0.53 0.42 0.48 0.51 0.59 0.37 0.35
Demand
Political and Regulatory
Environmental
Construction
Operations
Project Risk
Social
Adequacy of funding2
3
2
1
8
Currency Exchange
Interest Rate
7
6
5
4
Level of (mis)understanding of risks1
PelonomiHumansdorpIALCHIlembe DMPrisons
Time taken to contract1
Project delays3
Rustnbrg N4Maputo N4 DoEDTIDurban N3
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 APPENDIX C  :  CASE STUDY RISK SCORES 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Rating High High Average Low Average High High High High High
Score 4 4 3 2 3 4 4 4 4 4
Rating Average High Low Low Low High High High High High
Score 3 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4
Rating Very Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low High Very High High Very High Very High
Score 1 1 2 1 1 4 5 4 5 5
Rating Very Low Low High Low Low Average Low Low High High
Score 1 2 4 2 2 3 2 2 4 4
Rating Very High High Average Low Average Very High Very High High Average Very High
Score 5 4 3 2 3 5 5 4 3 5
Rating High Average Very High Very Low Low Low High Low High Low
Score 4 3 5 1 2 2 4 2 4 2
Rating Low High Average Low Low High Low Average High High
Score 2 4 3 2 2 4 2 3 4 4
Rating Low High Average Low Average High Low Average Average High
Score 2 4 3 2 3 4 2 3 3 4
Average Rating 3.0 3.3 3.3 2.0 2.4 3.9 3.7 3.4 4.0 3.9
Risk Score 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
Transaction Costs
Rating Long Long Average Average Average Very Long Average Long Average Very Long
Score 4 4 3 3 3 5 3 4 3 5
Rating Low High Very High Average Very High High Low Low Low Low
Score 4 2 1 3 1 2 4 4 4 4
Rating Long Short Average Average Average Average Average Average Long Long
Score 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4
Average Rating 4.00 2.67 2.33 3.00 2.33 3.33 3.33 3.67 3.67 4.33
Risk Score 0.80 0.53 0.47 0.60 0.47 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.73 0.87
Information Assymetry
Rating Low Average Low Low Low Average Low Low High High
Score 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 4
Risk Score 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8
Total Risk Score 0.60 0.60 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.68 0.60 0.61 0.78 0.81
Demand
Political and Regulatory
Environmental
Construction
Operations
Project Risk
Social
Adequacy of funding2
3
2
1
8
Currency Exchange
Interest Rate
7
6
5
4
Level of (mis)understanding of risks1
GFIPREIPPEskom
Time taken to contract1
Project delays3
DBN PointCoJ IRPTNDubeCOEGAGautrainTransnetACSA
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APPENDIX D  :   PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK  
 
 
Public Private Public Private
Weight 60% 100% 0 1
0.0% 100.0%
Weight 25% 100% 0 0.9999
0.0% 100.0%
Weight 10% 100% 0 1
0.0% 100.0%
Weight 5%
0.05 0.95
5.0% 95.0%
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Public 
Sector 
Capacity
1.00Overall Project Score
Risk Rating
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
Very Low
1
0.9999
0.25 0.25
1 100% 0% 1 0 1
1 25% 0% 100% 0
Total
Risk 
Weight
Risk Score     
(1 - 5)
Risk DescriptionRisk Identification
0.3333
1 25% 0% 100% 0 0.25 0.25
1 33.3% 0% 100% 0
0.3333
1
0.3333
1 33.3% 0% 100% 0
0.25
1 25% 0% 100% 0 0.25 0.25
0 0.250% 100%
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.1251 12.5% 0% 100% 0
0.125
1 12.5% 0% 100% 0 0.125
1
0% 100%
12.5%
12.5% 0% 100% 0
0.125
1 12.5% 0% 100% 0 0.125
1 12.5% 0% 100% 0
0.125Interest Rate
Currency Exchange
0.3333
0.3333
1
0 0.125
Role Clarifcation of 
Public/Private 
Sector
Transparency in 
Procourement 
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APPENDIX E  :   MULTIPLE MODEL REGRESSION DATA 
 
 
 
Project No.
Financing 
Mechanism
Project 
Risk
Transaction 
Costs Risk
Information 
Assymetry
Maputo N4 1 1 0.82 0.53 0.80
Rustnbrg N4 2 1 0.69 0.40 0.60
Durban N3 3 1 0.67 0.47 0.60
DTI 4 1 0.40 0.40 0.80
DoE 5 1 0.33 0.33 0.60
Prisons 6 1 0.58 0.67 0.20
Ilembe DM 7 1 0.67 0.67 0.20
IALCH 8 1 0.58 0.60 0.60
Humansdorp 9 1 0.44 0.47 0.20
Pelonomi 10 1 0.51 0.33 0.20
Eskom 11 0 0.60 0.80 0.40
REIPP 12 1 0.67 0.53 0.60
GFIP 13 1 0.67 0.47 0.40
ACSA 14 0 0.40 0.60 0.40
Transnet 15 0 0.49 0.47 0.40
Gautrain 16 1 0.78 0.67 0.60
COEGA 17 0 0.73 0.67 0.40
Dube 18 0 0.69 0.73 0.40
CoJ IRPTN 19 0 0.80 0.73 0.80
DBN Point 20 1 0.78 0.87 0.80
